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INTERNATIONAL commerce has never been completely free from govern-
mental regulation. Despite the theoretical advantages of free trade,' na-
tions have always erected barriers designed to protect the internal markets
of local economic interests.2 These import restrictions reduce international
specialization and raise the cost of living without a corresponding increase
in national income.3 And since this limitation on foreign competition usu-
1. The classic exposition of the advantages of free trade is contained in ADm
SMITH, THE WEALTH OF N.A.TIONS 424 (Modern Library ed. 1937): "If a foreign country
can supply us with a commodity cheaper than we ourselves can make it, letter buy it
of them with some part of the produce of our own industry, employed in a wvay in v.,hich
we have some advantage. The ... industry of the country is not employed to the
greatest advantage when it is . .. directed toward an object which it can buy cheaper
than it can make. . . . " See also RIc. ro, PRINIcrI.s OF POLITICAL ECo:.oy 77-93
(Everyman's ed. 1943). The contemporary case for free trade along substantially similar
but more sophisticated lines is ably presented in H.rmaiiEL THE TnEo- or" I:;.-
NATIoNAL TRADE 221-6 (1936) and VINER, STUDIES Ix THE TnEonv OF INTA ,N'rIo. NAL
TRADE 437-526 (1937). Some economists have even suggested that an individual country
may secure the benefits of free trade by a unilateral elimination of trade barriers. See,
e.g., BEVERSIGE, TARnF-s: THE CASE EXAmINED 109-10 (1931): "The gain through
removing obstacles depends in no way upon the removal of all ... obstacles or any
of them .... For other countries to tax our exports is an injury to us and an obstacle
to trade. For us to tax their exports is not a correction of that injury; it is just a
separate additional obstacle to trade."
2. "[T]here are a series of interferences with free trade because of sectional in-
terests which stand to gain by the tariffs and quotas and other impediments to free
trade which are constantly deaf to the irrelevant argument that the economy as a w:hole
must lose by the restrictions" LERxFD, THE EcoNoMIcs or CO.NT-OL 363 (1946). Addi-
tional arguments have been advanced to justify a protective tariff: (1) maintaining a
high domestic standard of living by preventing competition from cheap labor areas and
equalizing costs of production; (2) increasing national output by stimulating the growth
of new industries; (3) protecting "infant" industries; (4) immunizing the domestic
economy from fluctuations in economic activity in other countries; (5) fostering the
development of industries essential to military defense; (6) checking the ecessive pro-
duction for export of irreplaceable natural resources; (7) preventing domestic un-
employment. For a statement of some of these arguments, see Heckscher, Protection,
in 12 ENcYc. Soc. Sc'. 559 (1934); Alexander Hamilton, Report on the Subject of
Manufactures in PAPERs oN PuBLic CrEnrr, CommEcE A:D FiN.M:.cz (1934); LisT,
THE NATIONAL Sysr= OF PoLrIcAL EcoMY (Trans. ed. 1904); Knu~orH, I:Trm-
NATIONAL TRADE 102-11 (1938). These arguments are discussed and refuted in E.s-
wORTH, INTERNzATIONAL EcoNoMics 301-45 (1938). See also DmETdacu, Wor.n TrnAz
791-102 (1939); CoHN, PIcxING A=Ei-cA's POcrs (1936); TAussio, Frm TrAD,
THE TARuF AND Rn-cirocrrv (1920).
3. See the statement in BouLm:x.a, EcoNoMIc AN.,-sis 345 (1941): "The result
of the tariff .. is to transfer the production of the commodity from a place which is
more suited to a place which is less suited to its production, much as if a tax were laid
on the opera to encourage singing in the bathtub." Keynes, however, points out that
when a country has unemployed resources, a mercantilist policy of encouraging favorable
trade balances through import restrictions may, in fact, raise the domestic income level.
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ally benefits interests more powerful and more vocal than those which it
harms,4 governmental interference with imports comes to be regarded as a
state duty, rather than a usurpation of rights by the state.'
Export controls, on the contrary, have traditionally been employed only
in rare instances: 6during war and emergencies, to preserve essential mate-
See KEYNES, GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MoxNry 335 01 seq.
(1936). Nevertheless, though an individual country can gain by limiting trade with other
countries under some conditions, trade restrictions may impose a loss on other countries
greater than the gain to the country imposing them. See Samuelson, Welfare Economics
and International Trade, 28 Am. EcoN. REv. 261 (1938) ; Scitovszky, A Reconslideration
of the Theory of Tariffs, 9 REV. ECON. STUDIES 89 (1942); Metzler, The Theory of
International Trade in A SuRvEY OF CONT&mPORARY EcoNoIics 210, 242 (Ellis ed.
1948).
But "there are strong presumptions of a general character against trade restric-
tions unless they can be justified on special grounds. The advantages of the interna-
tional division of labor are real and substantial, even though the classical school greatly
overstressed them. The fact that the advantages which our own country gains from a
favorable balance is liable to involve an equal disadvantage to some other country ..-.
means that great moderation is necessary ... [because] an immoderate policy may lead
to a senseless international competition for a favorable balance which injures all alike.
And finally, a policy of trade restrictions is a treacherous instrument even for the attain-
ment of its ostensible object, since private interest, administrative incompetence and the
intrinsic difficulty of the task may divert it into producing results directly opposite
to those intended." KEYNES, op. cit. supra at 338-9.
4. "Those individuals in the community who are actively engaged in or connected
with foreign trade-importers, exporters, shippers, international bankers-will of course
tend to favor freer trade. In most communities, however, and particularly in the United
States, they are numerically much weaker than the business interests which favor pro-
tection. If and when they become powerful, we may expect to witness a low tariff move-
ment of some vigor." ELLSWoRTH, op. cit. supra note 2, at 344 n.1 (1938) ; See HEuussIt,
CONTROL OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE ix (1939).
5. HEUSER, op. cit. sitpra note 4, at ix. "If protection is granted to one industry,
it is always difficult and often impossible to find reasons for refusing protection to any
other industry . . . [I]ndeed, it tends to make protection seem not merely equitable but
necessary for others. . . The tariff grows like a snowball." BEVERIDGE, Op. Cit. supra note
1, at 115. Moreover, vested interests growing up behind walls established to protect par-
ticular markets resist any endeavor to reduce these barriers sheltering them. See Comiuxrn-
ciAL POLIcY IN THE POsT-WAR WORLD (League of Nations Publications II A: Econ. &
Financial No. 7) 23 (1945).
6. Export duties on raw materials have sometimes been imposed by non-industrial
countries for revenue purposes. As long as the world price of the taxed articles was
considerably higher than the internal cost of production, these countries could retain
some of the exporters' profit without injuring domestic producers. See EXPORT DUTIES
(League of Nations Publications II: Econ. & Financial No. 14) 3-11 (1927) ; GoHDox,
BARRIERS TO WoRLD TRADE 349-51 (1941). These duties were occasionally levied to
benefit domestic processing or fabricating industries or to grant a preferential status to
exports of raw materials from colonies to the mother country. EXPORT DUTIES, supra, at
4; STALEY, RAW MATERIALS IN PEACE AND WAR 67 (1937). Usually, where nations have
interfered with exports the emphasis has been on stimulating the volume of exports
rather than limiting them. Interdependence between this type of effort and import bar-
riers maintained to secure a favorable balance of trade "cannot be overemphasized. The
difficulty of disposing of export surpluses was greatly intensified by the multiplication of
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rials at home and to channel commodities in approved directions; 7 as part of
a commodity control scheme, either to secure an equitable world allocation
of goods, or to restrict foreign sales in order to maintain an artificially high
world price; 8 or as part of a bilateral agreement to control the terms of trade
trade barriers elsewhere; . .. protectionist policies at home tended to have the effet
of maintaining or increasing costs of production for export industries, thereby giving
rise to an argument for assistance to exports... ." Gonso-, op. cit. s$ ra, at 318. See
Carlson, Import and Export Controls, 11 LAw & CoNTEmp. PnOn. 795 (1946).
7. Go-nox, op. cit. supra note 6, at 352-3. Export controls were used as a club to
keep the peace under CoVENANT oF THE L.FAGTE OF NATIONS Art. 16, which authorized
member nations to sever all trade or financial relations with League members resorting
to war. For an analysis of how this interesting e\-periment in collective e:xpart embargo
of aggressors failed to work in practice, see Bonn, Hou, Sanctions Failed, 15 FcrnxoN
AFFAMS 350 (1937). And see Atwater, Administration of Export and Import Ew.-
bargoes, 1935-6 in GEEVA RESEA CH CENTRE, GENEVA STUDIES, IX, No. 6 (1938);
Highley, The First Sanctions Experiment in Id., No. 4; ROYAL INsTirUm oF I Tf-r
NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONAL SANCrIONS (1938) ; Sur.Ern, PRIIc-rxP ND Pr0u-
LE.S OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIo Ns 545-46 (1940). The United Nations Charter con-
tains a similar proviso granting the Security Council the right to call on member states
to take specifically named economic and diplomatic sanctions. U.N. CmHAR~ Art. 41; see
Kirk, The Enforcement of Securit , 55 YALE L. J. 10S1, 1099 (1946); Glcovacu &
H.ARO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: Con..:'TARY AND Docu-.m.-Ts 276-8 (24
ed. 1949).
8. International commodity arrangements exist for 12 commodities: beef, coffcce
cotton, petroleum, rice, rubber, sugar, tea, timber, tin, wheat, vool. For the text of some
of these arrangements, see REvIEW oF INTERNATIoNAL Comnsorr Ar=E-nma s
(United Nations Publications II, Dept. of Econ. Affairs No. 9, Interim Co-ordinating
Committee for International Commodity Arrangements) 31-5 (1947); IT2N= OA L
LAXOR OFFICF, INTERGovERNMENT'L CoMODITY CONTROL AG.'rIsr.sTs (1943). See
RAWv-'MATERIAL PRoBms AND POLICIS (League of Nations Publications II: Econ. &
Financial No. 2) (1936) ; Knorr, The Problem of International Cartels, 55 MAL L. J.
1097, 1110-26 (1946).
For a discussion of particular commodities controlled under these plans see:
Wheat: RowE, M umxrs .ND MEN 51-73 (1936); GrE,.vns, RAY: MATmLuAs AD
INTERNATIONAL CON'TROL 73-84 (1936).
Sugar: STALEY, op. cit. supra note 6, at 300-3; Com-sorrv COm o.- N THE: PAcrIc
AREA 224-65 (Holland ed. 1935); Row; op. cit. mtpra, at 74-92; Growlts, op. cit.
supra, at 99-106.
Tea: WIcKEzmz, TEA UNDER INTERNATIONAL RE.ULrLTIo, (1944); STALEY, op. cit.
supra, at 304-6.
Timber: STALEY, op. cit. supra, at 315-16; GrxkAvES, op. cit. mtpra, at 93-8.
Coffee: Roxw_, op. cit. supra, at 22-50; STAmy, op. cit. stpra, at 258-65.
Non-ferrous metals: ELLIoTT et al., INT mATioN.-. CON;TrOL IN TIE NON-F-2 OS
MurALS (1937) ; KNORR, TrN UNDER CONrOL (1945).
Rubber: KNoR, Wo-Dr RUnER AND rrs REGuLATIou (1945); WrnirLu-S , Gov-
ERN -- NT CommOL OF CRUDE Rutmm-THE STEVENso.- PLwa (1931); Rovx, op. cit.
supra, at 122-51; STALEY, op. cit. supra, at 290-3; GEw.vEs, op. cit. supra, at 124-9.
For a criticism of American willingness to participate in these schemes, see Wmr-
TLEsEY, NATIONAL INTEREST AND INTERNATIONAL CARTELS 112-17 (1946); for a defense,
Haley, United States Policy Regarding Commodity Agrecntws, 12 DEVT Sr.'r- Bu..
638 (1945).
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and balance of payments between two countries, or to retaliate for the im-
port curbs of other nations.9
American export controls do not fit neatly into any of these usual cate-
gories. They were first imposed as a war-time expedient in 1940, immediately
prior to the fall of France.10 Although many other wartime controls imposed
at the same time have since withered away, presidential power to regulate
9. For a general discussion of these controls in operation see HFUsEP., op. cit.
supra note 4, at 111-21; GORDON, op. cit. supra note 6, at 354-61; HAIGHT, FRENCH It-
PORT QuorAs (1935).
Clearing agreements and exchange controls often accomplished the same results as
export restrictions. For a general discussion of exchange control and clearing agree-
ments see REPORT ON EXCHANGE CONTROL (League of Nations Publications II A: Econ,
& Financial No. 10) (1938); ENQUIRY INTO CLEARING AGREEMENTS (League of Nations
Publication II B: Econ. & Financial No. 6) (1935); ELLIS, EXCHANGE CONTROL IN
CENTRAL EUROPE (1941); EINZIG, EXCHANGE CONTROL (1934); EINZIG, THE EXCIHANr
CLEARING SYSTEM (1935); Ohlin, Mechanism and Objectives of Exchange Control, 27
Am. EcoN. REv. SuPP. 141-50 (1937).
10. 54 STAT. 712, 714 (1940) authorized the President to prohibit or curtail the
export of military equipment or munitions and related items "in the interest of national
defense." 56 STAT. 463 (1942) broadened the power to include "any articles, technical
data, materials or supplies," and eliminated the requirement that the prohibition or
curtailment be in the interest of national defense. Legal challenges to this legislation
as an unconstitutional delegation of power were summarily repulsed: United States v.
Rosertberg, 150 F.2d 788 (2d Cir. 1945), aff'g 47 F.Supp. 406 (E.D.N.Y. 1942), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 752 (1945); United States v. Bareno, 50 F.Supp. 520 (D.Md. 1943).
Courts recognized the intimate relationship between foreign trade and foreign policy and
relied primarily on United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936),
which acknowledged the President's virtually plenary powers in the conduct of foreign
relations.
11. The First Decontrol Act, 61 STAT. 34 (1947) and the Second Decontrol Act,
61 STAT. 321 (1947), eliminated many wartime controls over domestic distribution,
production, prices, transportation, and shipping. The First War Powers Act, 54 STAT.
676 (1940), had empowered the President to confer priority on delivery of materials
under army and navy contracts over deliveries for private accounts or for export "in
the best interests of national defense during the national emergency." 55 STAT. 236 (1941)
broadened the President's power to include assignment of priorities to lend lease orders.
Title -III of the Second War Powers Act, 56 STAT. 176, 178 (1942), not only continued
powers to assign priorities but also provided that "whenever . . .the fulfillment of re-
quirements for the defense of the United States will result in a shortage in the supply
of any material or any facilities for defense or for private account, the President may
allocate such materials or facilities in such manner, upon such conditions and to such
extent as he shall deem necessary in the public interest and to promote the national
defense"' These priority and allocation powers were the basis for controls exercised by
the War Production Board and for the rationing scheme administered by the Office
of Price Administration.
While the Second Decontrol Act, 61 STAT. 321 (1947), abolished this regulatory
authority, priority and allocation powers were retained over (1) tin and tin products, ex-
cept for the purpose of exercising import controls over tin ores and tin concentrates; (2)
antimony; (3) chinchona bark, quinine and quinidine when held by any government agency
or acquired from a government agency; (4) materials for export required to expand or
maintain the production in foreign countries of materials critically needed in the United
lVol. 58:13251328
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exports has been repeatedly extended, despite avowed lack of Congressional
sympathy for the perpetuation of emergency controls.12 At present the
planned duration of export control authority coincides with most of the
projected life span of the European Recovery Program.
3
Only America's position of economic dominance in the world makes the
retention of export controls necessary. With productive capacity diminished
as a result of the war, most nations are unable to supply even normal needs
through home output. Filling the extraordinary requirements necessary
to permit speedy reconstruction requires even more outside assistance."
States, for the purpose of establishing priority in production and delivery for expart,
and materials necessary for the manufacture and delivery of the materials required for
such export; (5) fats and oils (excluding petroleum and petroleum prclucts) and rice
and rice products for the purpose of exercising import control only; (6) nitrogenous
fertilizer materials for the purpose of exercising import control and of establishing
priority in production and delivery for export; (7) materials, except foods and frd
products, manila fiber and cordage, agave fiber and cordage, and fertilizer materials,
including petroleum products, required for export, but only upon certification by the
Secretary of State that the prompt export of such materials would be of high public
importance and essential to the successful carrying out of the foreign policy oi the United
States, for the purpose of establishing priority in production and delivery for exrort,
and materials necessary for the manufacture and delivery of such materials required
for such export-but only if the Secretary of Commerce agreed that the prip:cd action
would not have an unduly adverse effect on the domestic economy of the United States;
(8) the use of transportation facilities by rail carriers. 61 SiT. 321, 322 (1947).
Pub. L. 427, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 23, 1948), e-tcnded these plwers till May
31, 1948. Pub. L. 606, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (June 4, 1943), again extended prioritic
powers until June 30, 1949 but eliminated authority to control chinchona Lad:, quinine
and quinidine. See H.R. SELECt Comm rrr, o-. For.xo:. Am (hereinafter cited as
HRnrm Co-dM=rm), PRELnmmnAY RrF0or No. 16 at 4-3 (1948) ; Sr.-. Dcc. Xo. 111,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 181-90 (1947).
12. See preamble to the Second Decontrol Act, 61 STAT. 321, 322 (1947): "It is
the general policy of the United States to eliminate wartime control of materials except
to the minimum extent necessary. . . ." SE-. Dom. No. 111, C0th Cong., 1st Sezs. 131
(1947) declares that "Pursuant to the clearly expressed will of the Congress, the execu-
tive branch has used sparingly the controls which were left on the statute bvos." On
the difficulty of eliminating wartime controls, see CLrxm, Dn:ronunzxro, oF MI',rma=
Ecoxomic Co.xTRoLs (1944) ; TE T&,x-smor ro- s W.,an To PE.cn Ecoxom" (League
of Nations Publications II A: Econ. & Financial No. 3) (1943) ; Lauterbach, Economic
Demobiliz-ation in the United States After the First World War, 57 PoL. SCL Q. S04
(1942).
13. Pub. L. 11, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 26, 1949) (cited hereinafter as Expzrt
Control Act), replaces 54 STAT. 714 (1940), as amended, 56 STr.w. 463 (1942), 50
U.S.C.A. App. § 701 (Supp. 1948). Section 12 provides that authority to control exports
shall terminate June 30, 1951, or upon any prior date which the Congress, by concurrent
resolution, or the President, may designate. The Economic Cooperation Act of 194S,
62 STAT. 137, 156, 22 U.S.C.A. § 1520 et scq. (Supp. 1948), vUill expire June 80, 1952.
Congress seems determined not to extend the Foreign Assistance Act beyond this date.
SEr. RF,. No. 100, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1949).
14. Industrial production in Belgium, France and the Netherlands was reduced to
30-40% of pre-war and in Italy to only 20%. Production of bread grains fell to only
2/3 of pre-war. Cosmanrr OF EuROrEAN EcoNoz.c Co-oFzmTo:€, Voni. I, G:;ur-AL
1949] 131,9
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Because American industrial and agricultural output increased vastly during
the war and post-war years, America has become the source of supply for
most of the world. Foreign countries rely on the United States for a sub-
stantial share of the food, fuel and materials on which economic recovery
and development abroad depend. Is
By pledging itself to hasten European recovery, the United States has
assumed responsibilities commensurate with its economic power."0 But
despite steady gains in production, supplies of many commodities remain
inadequate to meet combined foreign and domestic demands."7 Unrestricted
REPORT 7 (1947). See H.R. REP. 323, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1949). Per capita calorie
consumption in European countries declined 18% in total food and 12% in grain food.
PosT-wAR SHORTAGES OF FOOD AND COAL (United Nations Publications II A: Dept. of
Econ. Affairs No. 3) 3-4 (1948). For a summary of basic statistics on European re-
sources and future import requirements, see A SURVEY OF THE ECONOMIC SITUATION
AND PROSPECTS OF EuRops (United Nations Publications II E: Dept. of Econ, Affairs
No. 1) (1948); CoMMIT=T OF EUROPEAN EcONOMIc CO-OPERATION, VOL. I, G"ERAL
REPORT 41-9 (1947) ; id., VOL. II, TECHNICAL REPORTS, passim (1947) ; EUitOPEAN rE-
cOVERY PROGRAM, COMMODITY REPORTS (Dep't State Pub. No. 3093, Econ. Coop. Ser. No.
3) (1948) ; HERTER COMMIrr PRELIMNARY REPORT No. 9 (1947) ; Sm. Doe. No. 111,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 51-4 (1947).
Since the end of the war, Europe has made substantial recovery. European output
of petroleum products, steel, pig iron, lead, zinc, and bread grains increased 40% in 1948
over 1947 production, while aluminum and tin increased between 35% and 40o. OR-
GANIZATION FOR EUROPEAN ECONOMIC Co-oPERATION, REPORT TO TlE EcoNoMIc Co-
OPERATION ADMINISTRATION ON THE FIRST ANNUA. PROGRAMME 10 (1949); see also
H. R. REP. No. 323, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 4-10 (1949) ; SEN. Doc. No. 111, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. 19-25 (1947). For even more recent statistics on the extent of European re-
covery, see PROGRESS IN EUROPEAN RECOVERY AND THE ROAD AHEAD (Dep't State Pub,
No. 3466, Econ. Coop. Ser. No. 16) 2 (1949).
15. Not only are -war-devasted countries dependent on the United States, but other
countries normally supplied by these countries to a significant extent have become ab-
normally dependent on the United States for their material needs. As a result, American
exports to meet these demands in the first quarter of 1948, for example, were twice the
dollar value of the 1936-38 average. SEc'Y COMM., 4vu QUARTERLY REPORT, ExPoRT
CONTROL AND ALLOCATION PowERs 7-9 (1948) (hereinafter cited as 4 EXPORT CONTROL
REPORT). (These reports were originally required under § 6(b) of the Second Decontrol
Act, 61 STAT. 321, 324 (1947). Similar reports are required under Export Control Act
§ 8.) On American capacity to satisfy these European needs, see RrP. Slc'Y INT., NA-
TIONAL RESOURCES AND FOREIGN AID (1947) ; PRESIENT'S COMMITTEE ON FORE=IN Au,
EUROPEAN RECOVERY AND FOREIGN AID (1947); HERTER COMMIrrEE PRELIMINARY Rit-
PORT No. 9 (1947).
16. For an exhaustive review of American foreign economic assistance legislation see
Crawford, United States Foreign Assistance Legislation, 1947-1948, 58 YALE L. 5. 871
(1949) ; Surrey, The Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, 36 CALIF. L. REV. 509 (1948).
See also SEN. Doc. No. 111, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1947). Aid from private sources to
supplement this governmental assistance is estimated to exceed $500 million. Id. at 29.
17. In February, 1948, HERTER CoMMInE PRELIMINARY REPORT No. 16 described
"the probable plight of individual commodities in a free market world .... Lumber: in
the absence of controls, exports might be double the present rate. Petroleum: . .. Free
exports might take several times the present availabilities .... Cereals: Urgent foreign
requirements are larger and supplies smaller." See REP. Se'Yx IT., ,l tpra note 15, at 56:
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exports, therefore, may have inflationary repercussions on domestic prices.
Export controls serve to filter the drain of still scarce commodities. 1 In the
domestic market they vitiate the inflationary impact of abnormal foreign
demands. 9 By influencing the international distribution of goods, they
facilitate fulfillment of American international commitments. Moreover,
they enable the United States to exercise the necessary vigilance over ex-
ports significant to the national security.1'
THE CiOicE OF VEAPONS
Non-quantitatie Restrictions
Since a private enterprise economy relies primarily on competitive price
to influence individual choice, governmental regulation may consciously
make use of the market mechanism to secure a desired character, volume
and direction of international trade.2' At least four non-quantitative
restrictions that influence trade by influencing the terms of trade may be
distinguished: duties or tariffs, proportioned to the volume or value of
goods sought to be traded; 22 governmental grants disguised as premiums
or subsidies; 23 deliberate currency appreciation or depredation that re-
"... [D]emand for iron and steel has been running ahead of the supply"; See Hcarings
before Comnittee .on Banking and Currency on H. R. 1661, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 6
(1949); SEN. RFp. No. 31, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1949); Hearings Before HR. Cow-
mnttee on Intcrstate and Foreign Commerce on Fuel Inzestigation (hereinafter cited as
Ficel Hearings), 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 1547 (194S).
18. Voluntary allocation agreements are an alternative method of solving this prob-
lem. 61 STAT. 945 (1947) authorized the President to consult with representatives of
business and agriculture ith a view to making voluntary agreements providing for pri-
ority allocation and inventory control of scarce commodities .vhich basically affect the
cost of living or industrial production. Authority to conclude such agrements, immune
from prosecution under the anti-trust laws, has been extended until Sept. 30, 1949, by
Pub. L. 6, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 9, 1949). See SEN. RP. No. 23, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1949); H.R. REP. No. 8, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949); Hearings before Comittee on.
Bamking and Currency on S. 547, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949). Many such agreements
have already been made for domestic industries but proposals for voluntary allocation of
scarce goods to foreign aid programs are still under consideration. Report of the Office
of Industry Cooperation on the Voluntary Allocation Program 5, 50 (1948) (mimeo.).
19. For a discussion of the possible effect on price of e.x-port restrictions in the e.%pirt
market see p. 1335 and note 36 infra. Price controls, of course, may avoid this danger.
See pp. 1344-6 infra.
20. See Export Control Act §§ 1 and 2 ("Findings" and "Declaration of Policy").
Similar objectives were enunciated in the Second Decontrol Act, 61 STrT. 321, 322 (1947).
21. HEUSE, op. cit. supra note 4, at 75.
22. Viner, Tariff, in 14 ENcyc. Soc. Sc. 514 (1934) and Grunzel, Custoins Duties,
in 4 ENcyc. Soc. Sci. 667 (1934); HABERL, op. cit. supra note 1, Chap. XIX. His-
torically, America has vacillated betveen a protectionist tariff and a tariff ostensibly for
revenue only. See, e.g., TAussiG, TAnRFF HiST Ry OF THE Ulrrr Smrzs (Sth ed. 1931).
For a defense of tariffs as a device for controlling trade, see letter of Richard H. An-
thony, Secretary of the American Tariff League, N. Y. Times, Mard 25, 1949, p. 22,
col. 6.
23. The League of Nations defines export subsidies as "various kinds of payments or
13311949]
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sults in a wholesale readjustment of comparative price structures; 24 and
license fees and charges, coupled with veterinary and packing regulations,
that hamper commercial intercourse.
25
In the past, America has freely employed all of these non-quantitative
restrictions on imports for protectionist purposes.2 None of these devices,
however, is an appropriate instrument for export control. The constitutional
ban against taxes on exportation precludes the use of duties as an export
control device. 27 And the other non-quantitative restrictions, while not
other benefits granted by the state or by private organizations upon the production or
exportation of specified articles, thus placing the subsidized industry or branch in a more
favorable position as compared with other similar national or foreign industries or export
branches." DocumENTATiox, Dncr AND INDiRECT SussDSEs (League of Nations Publi-
cations II: Econ. & Financial No. 35) 8 (1927). Compare the definition in DiaTnicit, op.
cit. supra note 2, at 94. It has been estimated that some countries subsidized exports as
much as 35% in the period 1935-38. ELLIS, op. cit. supra note 9, at 240. For a discussion
of the extent to which export subsidies have been employed and their consequences on the
domestic economy, see GORDON, op. cit. supra note 6, at 326-39; Carlson, Import and x.V-
port Controls, 11 LAW & CONTEMP. PRon. 795, 805-7 (1946). 49 STAT. 774 (1935), as
amended, 7 U.S.C.A. § 612(c) (Supp. 1948), authorizes export subsidies in case of domes-
tic surpluses.
24. See Ellis, Exchange Conirol and Discrimination, 37 Am. Ecox. Rgv. 877 (1947).
On the dangers involved in an unexpected depreciation in currency values, see HADFRIXI
op. cit. supra note 1, at 45; HARRIS, EXCHAN(E DEPREIATION (1936). Whatever trade
advantages may be secured by currency devaluation are likely to be offset by retaliatory
measures instituted by foreign countries placed at a disadvantage by artificially created
unfavorable exchange ratios. See Silverstein, Effects of the American Devaluation on
Prices and Export Trade, 27 Am. EcoN. REv. 279 (1937), discussing American experi-
ence with currency devaluation pursuant to the Thomas Inflation Law, Title III of the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, 48 STAT. 51 (1933). A constitutional conflict was
precipitated over Congressional power, exercised in a joint resolution, 48 STAT. 112-13
(1933) that abrogated contract clauses calling for payment in gold. The Supreme Court,
however, sustained the constitutionality of this resolution as applied to both privately is-
sued bonds, Norman v. Baltimore & 0. Ry., 294 U.S. 240 (1935) ; and obligations of the
United States, Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935).
25. Other devices generically labelled "administrative protection" include marks of
origin requirements, arbitrary and discriminatory tariff nomenclature, oppressive customs
formalities, arbitrary valuations and preferential railway rates. Frequently this kind of
protection is a consequence of the way the customs laws are enforced by administrative
officials. ELLSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 2, at 356. See, in general, Winslow, eldminlsira-
tive Protectionism: A Problem in Commercial Policy in EXPLORATIONS IN ECONOMICS 179
(1936). For proposals to liberalize and simplify American customs procedures advanced
by the United States Associates of the International Chamber of Commerce, see N. Y.
Times, Jan. 30, 1949, § 3, p. 1, col. 1. Another form of indirect protection is the popular
boycott of foreign products, under private or governmental auspices. Sometimes these
boycotts are incorporated into statute. See the Buy American Act of 1933, 47 STAT. 1520
(1933), 41 U.S.C. § 10 (1946), which provides that only domestically produced articles
shall be acquired for public use, except where the articles are acquired for foreign
use, where the domestic price is unreasonable, where the supply is inadequate or where it
is in the public interest to permit foreign procurement.
26. See notes 22-5 sitpra.
27. U.S. CowsT. Art. I, § 9 (5) : "No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported
[Vol. 58: 1325;1332
EXPORT CONTROLS
similarly prohibited by constitutional limitations, dearly are neither eco-
nomically feasible nor completely effective.2
Quantitative Restrictions
More effectively, the government may supervise the distribution of
exports by controls which operate in the first instance not on price but
directly on the quantity or value of goods entering the stream of inter-
national commerce.23 While these quantitative restrictions are free from
any constitutional infirmity, not all the variant forms such restrictions
may take are equally fitted for the task of controlling exports. Monopolies
and cartels to limit output and sales, for example, whether governmental
or private, are repugnant to the American competitive tradition and the
spirit of the anti-trust laws, whatever their merits as a control device.^-
And exchange controls that regulate the flow of money and international
from any State." A similar provision bars states from laying duties on exports without
the consent of Congress. U.S. Co- sT. Art I, § 10 (2).
28. In general, non-quantitative restrictions suffer from a lack of the flexibility and
precision that characterize quotas as a trade control device. See p. 1334 and notes 32-
34 infra. More specifically, administrative protectionism merely hampers rather than
regulates trade, and can function only as a supplement or make-weight to other forms of
trade control; governmental premiums and/or subsidies involve outlays too large in pro-
portion to the goals sought to be achieved, particularly when other equally or more effec-
tive and less expensive means are available; and currency devaluation, by affecting all
prices, provides no assurance that only trade in particular commodities vill be affected
by the altered price ratio. See also note 24 supra.
29. The clearest exposition of the differences betw-een quantitative and non-quantita-
tive restrictions can be found in QUANTITATIVE TRA'DE Comm nvxs (League of Nations
Publications II: Econ. & Financial No. 5) (1943). Since e.\port restrictions have ben
so rarely employed, most analyses of the effects of quantitative restrictions have b-en in
terms of import restrictions, e.g., HEusER, op. cit. supra note 4; HAGH', op. Cit. Sv ra
note 9.
30. "In the United States, government policy, widely supported by public opinion, is
hostile to the participation of American firms in international cartels. The maintenance of
the American system of private enterprise is grounded on the assumption that it is a com-
petitive system and that active competition among our business firms is estential to pro-
mote technical progress and to insure an equitable division of the national income" Bin-
WEtLL, A CO11=CALMz. POLICY roR THE UNITEr NAT.Ios 49 (1945).
European efforts to regulate cartels have been uniformly unsuccessful. See Kronstein
& Leighton, Cartel Control: A Record of Failure, 55 YALE L. J. -79 (1946). For a dis-
cussion of the nature of the cartel problem and how to deal with it, see SocIMMa & NVAT-
xnis, CA rLS OR CoMPI'rmON? (1948); ST0CKL'G & VVATEmLs, CArr-.s n: AcTio:.
(1946); INTERATIoNAL CARTELS (United Nations Publications II D: Dept. of Econ.
Affairs No. 2) (1948); EDIWARDs, A C.-%rzi_ POLICY FO: THE UNrrTD NATIO:S (1945);
HExI.xER, IN-mNATioNAL CARmTs (1945); BERGE, C.AIrZs: CRAur.u::on TO1 A Fr=--
WoRLD (1944) ; Terrill, The American Trade Proposals: Restrictiv'e Business Practices,
14 DEPT' STATE BIm. 455 (1946) ; Clayton, Private Barriers to Intcn:ational Trade, 12
Dan"s STATE BuuL. 933 (1945); Knorr, Problems of International Cartels, 55 Yrm L. J.
1097 (1946); Lockvood & Schmeisser, Restricthe Business Practices in Intcrratioual
Trade, 11 Lsvw & Co-mmn'. Pnon. 663 (1946); Berge, Cartels as Barriers to Interra-
tional Trade, 11 LAw & Co-rzmn'. PROB. 6S4 (1946).
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payment can be effective only where a shortage of foreign funds exists in
the exporting country. 31
A quota system, on the other hand, possesses unique advantages. When
coupled with a mechanism for licensing overseas shipments, quotas clearly
permit greater precision and certainty in controlling the size, nature and
destination of proposed exports than all non-quantitative devices.32 It is
always possible theoretically to find a non-quantitative restriction that is
equivalent to a given quota, i.e., one that would restrict exports to the same
level. But unforeseen changes in a cost structure or improvements in pro-
duction technique, for example, may make it possible to export quantities
in excess of a desired amount despite the burden of non-quantitative export
controls. Non-quantitative barriers, therefore, are only "conformable"
types of state interference with foreign commerce. Quotas, on the other
hand, are "non-conformable" interferences: by no legal means can predeter-
mined export ceilings be exceeded. 33 Moreover, a quota system delegated
to administrative discretion is more responsive to changes in domestic
supply and foreign needs than the cumbersome legislative procedures and
bilateral negotiations currently required for tariff changes.3 4
At the same time, a quota system for export control carries with it the
germs of possible abuse. By directly restricting the scope of individual eco-
nomic activity and threatening with punishment anyone who attempts to
31. Exchange controls usually grow primarily out of disturbances in the balance of
payments and are designed to protect the value of the currency. Import restrictions are
maintained primarily to protect particular industries, see note 2 supra. Though exchange
controls can arise independently and be administered separately, in practice these controls
have been integrated with import controls for achievement of both ends, protection of the
currency and of particular industries. QUANTITATIVE TRADE CoNTRoLs (League of Na-
tions Publications II: Econ. & Financial No. 5) 8 (1943). See ELis, op. Cit. supra note
9, at 289.
32. If "flexibility, precision and quickness of adjustment of ... [an] import quota
system [make] it an admirable instrument" for achieving particular objectives, Carlston,
Import and Export Controls, 11 LAW & CONTEMP. Paon. 795, 798 (1946), export quotas
should be equally effective and for the same reasons.
33. QUANTiTATIVE TRADE CONTROLS (League of Nations Publications II: Econ. &
Financial No. 5) 20 (1943). While it is highly unlikely, the quota might be sufficiently
large to permit exportation of a quantity equal to that which would be sold abroad under
free trade conditions. See GORnON, op. cit. sipra note 6, at 232 n.4.
34. "Parliamentary procedures are much too slow to permit of the rapid changes
which are required under a system of quantitative restriction .... [U]nder such a sys-
tem, much latitude must be left to the executive branch of government. . . while in most
democratic governments the adoption of the tariff has traditionally, been a jealously
guarded prerogative of the legislative branch. . . ." QUANTITATIVE TRADE CONTROLS
(League of Nations Publications II: Econ. & Financial No. 5) 27 (1943). "The fixing
of quotas . . . must be left, obviously, to the executive branches of the government. If the
drawing up of a modem tariff schedule seems too complex and technical a problem for
the rather cumbersome process of parliamentary action, it is obvious that the determina-
tion of appropriate quotas for a large number of commodities must be handled by adminis-
trative bodies." GORDoN, op. cit. supra note 6, at 255.
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substitute his own decisions for those of the state, quota limitations represent
a serious interference with the functioning of a private enterprise economy.35
In addition, export quotas usually produce price differences between the
exporting and importing country not covered by cost, insurance and freight:
when the quota is smaller than the amount that would be exported in the
absence of quotas, the price will tend to rise for foreign purchasers and de-
cline in the domestic market. This price differential could place exporters
fortunate enough to secure export permission in a dominant position in which
monopolistic profits may be reaped." Simultaneously, already slender
dollar resources in receiving countries would be further depleted.
Though a quota system is subject to these inherent dangers, statutory
authorization for export controls envisages a regulatory scheme grounded
on quantitative restrictions.37 The Export Control Act empowers the Presi-
dent to "prohibit, or curtail the exportation from the United States . . . of
any articles, materials and supplies, including technical data, except under
such rules and regulations as he shall prescribe." 3 Power to "prohibit or cur-
tail" the export of most commodities, vested by executive order in the Office
of International Trade (OIT), " is exercised through an elaborate licensing
35. W1illingness to accept these restrictions on private activity stems from a hope,
whether justified or not, that government regulation will afford "some chance of an im-
proved economic position," HEusrn, op. cit. supra note 4, at b-, and from an increasing
emphasis on the fact that an unimpeded woridng of the free market system is not neces-
sarily in the best interests of each individual country, Metzler, The Thcory of Intern'-
tional Trade, in A SuavEy OF COxTa, _akPOnRY Eco.zomcs 210, 253 (Ellis ed. 1943); cee
note 3 supra. See also the statement of Thomas C. Blaisdell, Acting Assistant Secretary
of Commerce: "Nations have placed controls on trade not because they like controls but
because controls appear to be a more desirable method of regulating economic life than to
submit business men and workers to the adjusting mechanism of boom, depression and
unemployment." N. Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1949, p. 41, col. 3.
36. This ability to obtain monopolistic profits assumes that commodities traded are un-
available elsewhere, that demand is inelastic in relation to price, and that there are no
ready substitutes. When this monopolistic power exists, "governments have ... not only
the possibility of controlling the economic activities of those under their immediate juris-
diction, but also the power to make their policies more effective by exerting a profound
influence on the actions of other states." HEvusER, op. cit. supra note 4, at 250.
37. Export quotas may be a recent phenomenon, but import quotas are not unlmown
in American commercial history. For a full discussion of American import quotas, zee
Whittlesey, Import Quotas in the United States, 52 Q. J. Eco. 37 (1937). For a dis-
cussion of the difficulties the United States has encountered because of quantitative restric-
tions in negotiating commercial treaties, see TAscA%, WoRLD TrADn:G SYsunzss 7-44
(1939).
38. Export Control Act § 3 (a).
39. Administration of Export controls under the first export control act, 54 STAT.
712, 714 (1940) was originally vested in the Administrator of Export Control, under
Pres. Proc. No. 2413, 5 FaD. RFG. 2467 (1940). Functions exercised by the Administra-
tor were subsequently transferred to a series of agencies created for purposes of cconomic
defense and warfare: to the Economic Defense Board, Exec. Order 8900, 6 Fmn. Rmn.
4795 (1941) (renamed the Board of Economic Warfare, F-xec. Order 6932, 6 Fun. Rru.
6530 (1941)) ; to the Office of Economic Warfare, F-xec. Order 9361, 3 FzD. Run. 9261
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machinery. OIT decides when commodities are to be controlled, fixes quotas,
determines geographic distribution, grants export licenses to appropriate
exporters, and enforces compliance with license awards. But since OIT
lacked peacetime experience in operating this machinery, satisfactory tech-
niques developed slowly, through trial and error. And since OIT is a branch
of the Department of Commerce, its delegated duty to restrict exports has
collided with the principal function of all Department of Commerce agencies:
to foster and promote international trade. 40
THE QUOTA SYSTEM IN OPERATION
Quota Determination and Allocation
Minute and detailed supervision over all American exports would pre-
sent an impossible administrative burden. In practice, therefore, export
controls are merely selective. Some three hundred "Positive List" com-
modities, which the OIT considers to be in domestic short supply, require
export licenses regardless of destination.4 1 Unrestricted exports would force
the domestic prices of these commodities to inflationary levels and cause
severe shortages and dislocations. Even where domestic supplies are con-
(1943) ; to the Foreign Economic Administrator, Exec. Order 9380, 8 FrD. REG. 13081
(1943) ; and finally to the Commerce Department, Exec. Order 9630, 10 FED. REo. 12245
(1945) and Exec. Order 9919, 13 FED. REG. 59 (1948). Authority in turn was subdele-
gated by the Secretary of Commerce to the Office of International Trade, Dept. Com-
merce Order No. 390, 10 FED. RE. 13130 (1945) effective Oct. 21, 1945.
Some commodities are licensed by other agencies: The State Department licenses
arms, ammunition and implements of war, tinplate scrap and helium; the Treasury De-
partment licenses export of gold commodities, with the exception of fabricated gold, and
narcotic drugs; the Atomic Energy Commission licenses material and facilities for the
production of fissionable materials. See COMPREHENSIvE EXPORT SciEiULE No. 26, Oct.
1, 1948, pp. 78-9; CURRENT EXPORT BULLETIN No. 449, April 15, 1948; CUnRENT Exrowr
BULLETIN No. 459, June 16, 1948, p. 3.
40. OIT is part of the Commerce Department's Bureau of Foreign and Domestic
Commerce for which funds were first appropriated by 37 STAT. 408 (1912) to "foster,
promote and develop the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States." For a
recent report on how OIT has discharged its responsibilities under this mandate see 36
SEC'Y Comam. ANN. REP. xxiii, 167-79 (1948).
41. On Jan. 1, 1949, the "Positive List" included 379 commodities out of a total of
2000 items in the census classification. SFc'y Comm., 6TH QUARTERLY REP., ExPoRT Cox-
TROL AND ALLOCATION PowRs 9 (1949) (hereinafter cited as 6 ExPoRT CONTROL RrrouT).
Exports of commodities on the positive list amounted to $724,000,000, 249' of total United
States exports. Major commodities on the list included grain, steel, fuel, nonferrous met-
als and fats and oils. Grain, steel and fuel accounted for 84% of all positive list ship-
ments. Id. at 12, and see pp. 92-9. See Hearings before Subcommittee of Committee on
Banking and Currency on S. 548, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 16-20 (1949). In March, 1949,
many commodities were removed from the "Positive List," e.g., a few grain products,
OIT Press Release No. 326, March 1, 1949; forest products, OIT Press Release No. 333,
March 11, 1949; antimony oxide and sulfide, bismuth, lead and coal tar chemicals, OIT
Press Release No. 335, March 18, 1949. And in May, 1949, OIT removed still other
commodities from the "Positive List" because of increasingly plentiful domestic supplies.
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sidered to be adequate for domestic needs at tolerable prices, a few com-
modities are similarly controlled to secure their geographic distribution in
accordance with the recommendations of international allocating bodies in
which the United States participates. -4 2 But the bulk of commodities, other
than those on the "Positive List", are controlled only when intended for
European destinations!4
3
Setting an appropriate total export quota for controlled commodities
requires the resolution of two objectives that frequently cannot be simul-
taneously achieved-restricting certain exports to cushion the domestic
economy against inflatiohary pressures while encouraging certain exports in
order to assure the success of American foreign policy.
Collectionz of Data. Reconciling foreign and domestic needs is primarily
OIT's responsibility. But several executive departments and independent
'agencies concerned with "policies and operations having an important bear-
ing on exports" combine with OIT in determining which commodities are
to be controlled and in setting the quota amount.44 Normally, quotas are
See OIT Press Release No. 464 (meat products), May 7, 1949; OIT Precs Releace No.
365 (iron and steel products), May 9, 1949; OIT Press Release No. 365 (steel prefabri-
cated houses, aluminum prefabricated houses, metal conduits and fittings, cast iron coil
pipe, etc.), May 11, 1949.
42. 4 Exroar CoxroL REP o-r 32. Chief of these agencies is the International Emer-
gency Food Committee, now a part of the Food and Agriculture Organization, which
makes recommendations concerning the allocation of beans and peas, cereals, c, oa, fats
and oils including soaps, nitrogenous fertilizers, meat and meat products, rice, seeds and
protein foods. The Combined Tin Committee, consisting of representatives from Bel-
gium, France, The Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States, India and Canada,
makes recommendations dividing estimated total supplies as stated by producing countrics
among importing countries. Other committees function on an inter-agency levd. The
Coal Operating Committee established the quantity of different grades to be c-xported and
the distribution among claimant countries. The Interior Department set up an Interde-
partmental Petroleum Committee, and committees ad hoc have been established for steel,
tin and rubber. Hmrzn Comm=TIE Ps Liu.%rY REro No. 22 at 40, 51-2, 54-6.
43. CuRmNxr EXPORT BUL=rr No. 434, Jan. 28, 1948, divided countries into two
groups for purposes of licensing: Group R countries include Europe and adjacent areas;
Group 0 includes all other countries except possessions of the United States and Canada,
not subject to export licensing, at all. 4 ExPoRT ComxOL Rnronr 6, 27. See Comxr-ur.--
snm ScHFnmr, No. 26, Oct. 1, 1948, p. 1S. Only "Positive List" commodities require li-
censes for shipment to Group 0 countries. Many commodities have recently been freed
of licensing restrictions even to European destinations. See, e.g., OIT Press Release
No. 358, April 27, 1949, freeing 500 separate items from all export controls.
Publication of Cu=rNT ExPoRT BuLirrn. No. 434, supra, aroused a controversy be-
tween Amtorg, Soviet state trading monopoly, and American manufacturers, over the
status of contracts entered into prior to March 1, 1948, the effective date of Curnn:n Ex-
PorT BuLLINI No. 434, calling for delivery of commodities ineligible for export license
subsequent to March 1, 1948. See N. Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1949, § F, p. 1, col. 1 for report
of United States Wall Board Machinery Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corporation, an action
brought in the New York Supreme Court. See Note, 147 A. L. R. 120 (1943).
44. Export Control Act §4(a). These agencies include the Departments of State,
Agriculture, Interior, Treasury and Labor, the National Military Establishment, the Ec-
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based on an estimate of total American production less estimated demand.
American foreign service personnel and foreign governments supply informa-
tion for each importing country regarding total needs, domestic production
and quantity available from other sources. From this statistical data, com-
pared with the historical record of American exports and prior licensing ex-
perience, a quota emerges that fixes the quantity of each controlled com-
modity available for foreign shipment. 4 Within these totals judgments
have to be made as to the relative importance of each country's require-
ments.4" Similar comparisons must be made among proposed competing
uses.
47
Destination and end use controls enable supplies to be distributed in a
onomic Cooperation Administration, the Housing and Home Financing Agency, the Na-
tional Security Resources Board and the Council of Economic Advisers. 6 EXoUT CoNTR L
REPORT 9. In addition OIT has established Commodity Advisory Panels and Commodity
Advisory Committees representing a cross-section of the export trade "from the standpoints
of (1) large, medium and small companies, (2) geographical distribution, (3) trade associa-
tion membership, and (4) segments of the export trade involved-e.g., by levels of the ex-
port trade (such as manufacturers, suppliers of exporters, and various types of distributors,
including independent or merchant exporters), by degree of integration (such as manufac-
turing-exporters), by types of commodities, etc." These groups are frequently consulted and
advise OIT on export licensing policies and procedures. See CURRENT ExroRT BuLMTwN
No. 446, April 1, 1948; Third General Revision of Export Regulations, 15 Coan Fnn.
REcs., Cu. III, § 373.1, 13 FED. REG. 4077 (1948) ; 6 EXPORT CONTROL REPORT 13. For a
list of these panels see Fuel Hearings 2046-59.
45. Three different types of quotas are used: (1) quantitative quotas, fixing the
quantities which may be licensed for shipment to a particular country; (2) closed quotas,
doling out small parcels when OIT considers that special circumstances outweigh critical
domestic needs, after review by OIT's inter-agency committee; (3) open-end quotas,
where licenses are approved as received in order to provide a gauge for the volume of
exports to be expected in the absence of restrictions. Open-end quotas are sometimes used
for newly controlled items to obtain background information for the establishment of a
quantitative quota. 6 EXPORT CONTROL REPORT 10-11; HERTER CoMMiTTF= PR-LXIuNARY
REPORT No. 16 at 16-17; Hearings before Counnittee on Banking and Currency on& H. R.
1661, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1949).
46. 4 ExPoRT CONTROL REPORT 32-5. See Fuel Hearings 1588, 1596-1610, 1625,
1961-5. For a criticism of proposed tests of a "proper" export allowance, see I-IERTrt
COMMITTEE PRELImiNARY REPORT No. 16 at 28-36. "Neither the Department of Com-
merce nor its interdepartmental advisory committee have made such decisions based on
policy, nor were they in a position to make them. The Congress had given no mandate
to make them. There are few present governmental functions in which so large a concept
as the rebuilding of a foreign continent at the risk of domestic inflation can be properly
planned and the custody of what was regarded as a dying power was not one of them."
Id. at 31.
47. Appropriate end uses fall into two general categories: special projects and commer-
cial. Special project quotas are established to enable the export of commodities which will
(1) contribute to the attainment of the policy objectives of the United States; (2) further
the production abroad of commodities needed for United States domestic consumption or
reconversion or essential consumption in foreign countries; (3) permit construction or
operation of facilities necessary to the minimum essential civilian economy of the country
of destination; (4) lead to increased international trade with the United States in the
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manner most conducive to world recovery, rather than according to pur-
chasing power.41 But the effectiveness of these controls depends, in part,
upon the cooperation of importing countries in supplying 0IT with detailed
statements of requirements, indigenous production, anticipated imports and
proposed end uses. Where, as in the case of Eastern European countries,
such information has not been forthcoming, 0IT has sometimes established
a zero quota pending the receipt of requirements information similar to
that supplied by other countries. "
Participation by Economic Cooperation Administration. ECA officials
exercise no independent control over American exports, except insofar as
the Administrator participates in the quota determining process.t2 In-
stead, ECA merely makes funds available to the participating countries,
and these jointly and severally decide how and where such funds are to
ba spent." Nor does ECA alter the manner in which international transac-
future. See Third General Revision of Export Regulations, 15 CoDZ FED. Rmrs. § 375, 13
FED. REG. 4085 (1948); COMiPREHEsIVE EXPORT SCHEDULE No. 26, Oct. 1, 194%, pp. 47-3.
The remaining quota is reserved for commercial exporters. For example, of a total quota
of 1,120,000 tons of iron and steel products established in the third quarter of 1943, 235,-
000 tons were for special projects and the remainder available for commercial licensing.
OIT Press Release No. 215, Aug. 4, 1948.
48. In the first 6 months of 1948, uncontrolled exports amounted to q,850,32S.00 of
which 25%, or $1,211,056,000 went to European Recovery Program countries. In the
same period, controlled exports amounted to $1,643,210,000 of which over 597 or '97,-
484,000 went to European Recovery Program countries. H. R. REP. No. 18, 81st Cong.,
1st Sess. 2 (1949).
49. S'v-. CoMM., 3D QUARTERLY REPS., Exror CoYmoL AND ALLoCATon Powrrs
26-7 (1948) (hereinafter cited as 3 EXPORT CONTROL REroRT). Thomas C. Blaisdell, Acting
Assistant Secretary of Commerce, assured the House Committee on Interstate and For-
eign Commerce that if the information were supplied, and if the information were ade-
quate and the justification regarded as sufficient, the OIT would issue licenses on the
assumption that the United States was receiving from the Soviet Union an adequate re-
turn for goods sent to Russia. Fuel Hearings 1565-6.
50. See note 44 vtpra. Several bills were introduced in the House cf Repre Qntatives
in 1948 calling for the establishment of a European Recovery Program. The Herter
Committee bill, H. R. 4579, q0th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948), drawn along the lines suggcsted
by HERm' Com .iarRE PRI.DNl.IR Y REPORT No. S (1947), located export control au-
thority in the ECA Administrator, along with attendant power to make domestic alloca-
tions of critically short items. See HErTR CoMsrrTni Pr.rrnxi:;.,nY Rxoar 'No. 16 at
38-41 (1948). The government's proposals, H. R. 4S40, qOth Cong., 2d Sess. (1943) re-
tained then-existing export control authority in 0IT. In Committee, the government's iew
prevailed and the bill as approved gave the ECA Administrator only limited e.xport con-
trol powers. H. R. REP. No. 15S5, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 46-7 (1948).
OIT's preeminent power in fixing export allotments is ackmowledged by Paul
Hoffman, ECA Administrator. Hearings before H. R. Select Committee of; Smnall Brusi-
ness on the Impact of the European Recovery Program on American Small Business
80th Cong., 2d. Sess. 9 (1948).
51. See ORGANIZATION FOR EUROPEA.N EcoNomic CooPE rTon, RETORT n O TIE EcO-
Nomc CooPERAriox ADmINsqTRAT N ON THE SECOND A..;uA Pnornt._rm (1949);
ECA Release No. 160, Sept. 10, 1948; ECA, FIRST RE0oar To Com ESs 2-3 (1948).
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tions are-normally effected. Though individuals abroad who seek to buy
in the United States must first secure a payment authorization from the
government of their importing country, goods continue to be supplied
through regular trade channels.
5 2
Within the framework of controls administered by OIT, the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1948 does provide a limited priority position for ECA.
The Act forbids OIT to permit the export from the United States to non-
participating countries of commodities whose supply is insufficient to meet
the requirements of participating countries. 3 Moreover, ECA may refuse
delivery to participating countries of goods going into the manufacture of
commodities intended for shipment to non-participating countries, when
OIT would not license direct shipments of those commodities to non-par-
ticipating countries "in the interest of national security." 14 The Act, how-
ever, does not foreclose exports of scarce goods to non-participating countries
if OIT determines such export is in the national interest. 5 In practice, the
priority position of participating over non-participating countries has not
been denied, and OIT's administration of export controls has complemented
ECA by checking on the relative essentiality of goods for which ECA dollars
are spent." But since there is the possibility of conflict, the Act requires
prior and continuous consultation between OIT and ECA on all matters,
with appeal to the President for adjudication of differences. 7
Protecting National Security. OIT also consciously employs export con-
trols to influence the geographic distribution of goods in the interests of
national security. Commodities with direct military significance or basic
manufacturing importance are channelled away from Eastern Europe by
rigorous licensing practices.5" Close scrutiny of industrial equipment with
52. ECA Reg. No. 1, as amended, 13 FED. RE. 6046 (1948); JOIN STATEMENT,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMER CE AND EcoNoMIc COOPERATION ADMxNISTA'TOR (1948). See
Surrey, The Economic Cooperatio) Act of 1948, 36 CALIF. L. REV. 503, 527-38 (1948). The
Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, 62 STAT. 137, 143; 22 U.S.C.A. § 1509 (b) (Supp.
1948) requires full utilization of private trade channels. See SEN. REP. No. 100, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1949).
Shipments made under ECA payment authorizations nevertheless require an export
license. OIT has rejected the suggestion that all ECA shipments be automatically l-
censed because of the difficulty of identifying these shipments as such and because ECA,
making broad category allotments, has no mechanism for testing the national security
questions involved in particular exports. See N. Y. Times, March 5, 1949, p. 21, col. 1.
53. Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 § 112 (g), 62 SrAvT. 137, 148; 22 U.S.C.A.
§ 1510(g) (Supp. 1948).
54. Id., § 117(d), 62 STAT. 137, 153; 22 U.S.C.A. §1515 (d) (Supp. 1948).
55. Proviso added to Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 § 112(g), 62 STAT. 137, 148;
22 U.S.C.A. § 1510 (g) (Supp. 1948).
56. 4 ExPoRT CONTROL REPORT 13.
57. Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 § 105(c), 62 STAT, 137, 140; 22 U.S.C.A.
§ 1504(c) (Supp. 1948). See JOINT MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE ECO-
NOMIC COOPERATION ADMINISTRATOR AND THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CONCERNINx
THE PROGRAMMING OF ExPORTS (July 16, 1948).
58. H. R. REP'. No. 18, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1949) ; 4 ExroRT CONTROL REPORT 13.
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war potential supplements State Department controls over shipment of
actual arms, munitions and implements of war.-"
Export Priorities. Without additional governmental assistance, export
controls provide no assurance that any goods will be available to foreign
purchasers in the domestic market. Priority assistance, in the form of pref-
erential licensing or financial aid, provides the positive corollary of export
control, insuring that desired exports are available in sufficient quantiiesP
Regular programs for priority assistance have been established for two com-
modities-nitrogen fertilizer and tinplate-that contribute to the production
and preservation of food in foreign countries. Occasional priority assistance
has been employed when the material exported would expand foreign pro-
duction of commodities still scarce in the United States. 2 And once priority
assistance was invoked when the State Department certified that such as-
sistance was necessary to the success of American foreign policy.,1
Liciense Distribution
Requests for export permission frequently result in an oversubscription
of assigned quotas. 4 Some exporters are lured by the prospect of -reater
profits from foreign sales. Others desire to maintain established trade con-
nections. When supplies and competition increase in the domestic market,
as may occur if controls are maintained more for security reasons than be-
cause goods are in short supply, the pressure for licenses increases correla-
59. Pres. Proc. 2776, 13 ED. REG. 1623 (1943); 54 STr.v. 11 (1939), ac; amnk 22
U.S.C.A. § 452(i) (Supp. 1948); Curm NT ExroRT BUTLLtrri No. 449, April 1-, I943.
60. 6 ExPort CoN.TROL REpoRT 78. The Second Decontrol Act authorizes OIT to
grant ex-port priorities assistance until June 30, 1949. See note 11 su1pra.
61. 4 ExroRT Co.-=oL REtoRT 76-83. In the third quarter of 1947, the total value of
exports receiving export assistance w.as $27,707,000. Of this total, all but $107,000 was
used to assure exports of tinplate and fertilizer. SEe',. COrMx, lsr QOt%rTrXRY Rzp.,
EXPOrT CoNToL & ALLOCATTIoN PowrNs 29 (1948) (hereinafter cited as 1 Exr.-nT Co:z-
TROL REPORT) ; see Co,arHE.SlVE E_xroR ScHEiDrnu No. 24, Oct. 1, 1948, pp. 49-50;
HErmza CoXmIrrr PPExLaI,.IrY REPoRT No. 16 at 5-9. In 1948, 453,000 tons or seven-
eighths of the export quota of tinplate, 12.8% of the total output in the United States,
received priority assistance. Delivery of 31,000 tons of nitrogen fertilizer was guaranteed
by use of these powers. 4 ExronR CONROL REroRT 78, S2.
62. Two cases involved the export of material to be used for increasing foreign out-
put of tin and lead, both in short supply in the Unitcd States. In some cases, OIT has
arranged for applicants to receive needed supplies without invoLing formal priorities as-
sistance. 4 EXPORT CoNTRoL REroRT 76.
63. OIT employed its priority power to e-pedite the shipment of 4,GC0 tons of steel
to Greece. 4 ExPoRT CONROL REPORT 76. See also HER= Co,..irrinTm PEnr.-Axmn
REPORT No. 16 at 7. All priorities assistance has been undertaken within regular export
quotas. Total value of e.xports receiving priorities in these cases has been $C0009. 4 _--
PORT COnMOL REFORT 76.
64. In March, 1948, for example, a total quota of 240,000 bags of flour for Brazil was
announced. Requests for export permission totalled betveen 40 and E0 million bags, re-
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tively.65 Foreign consignees sometimes swell the volume of applications by
collusion with American exporters. Expecting to receive only part of the
goods applied for, importers place excessive orders without intending to
accept deliveries greater than actual requirements."
Distributing these quotas in the form of licenses among a large number of
applicants involves a quest for appropriate licensing standards. The Export
Control Act itself provides no adequate guide. It requires that "full utiliza-
tion of private trade channels" be encouraged-but only "insofar as prac-
ticable." 17 While commanded to give "consideration to the interests of
small business, merchant exporters as well as producers, and established and
new exporters," OIT is simultaneously authorized to apply "such standards
as may be deemed necessary." 6 Consequently, OIT has invoked adminis-
trative discretion to furnish suitable criteria. In the final allocation formula,
no single test predominates. Specific weights cannot be assigned factors in-
fluencing the ultimate pattern of license distribution.
Proration. One possible solution would be simple division of the available
quota among all applicants according to the amount sought to be exported.
Major advantages of this technique are administrative simplicity and speed
in making license awards. But resort to this rule would often allocate to each
exporter a quantity too small for profitable shipment.69 And proration in-
vites circumvention by encouraging applicants to request export permission
for quantities larger than those intended to be shipped." Together these
dangers create a problem of unused licenses that waste already limited ex-
quiring denial of 99Y21% of all applications. Fuel Hearings 1850-1, 1858. See OIT Press
Release No. 206, July 21, 1948 and OIT Press Release No. 232, Aug. 27, 1948.
License applications were received in 1947 as follows:
January 60,000 July 27,000
February 34,000 August 19,000
March 34,000 September 36,000
April 26,000 October 27,000
May 20,000 November 21,000
June 27,000 December 33,000
HmrE CoMMIrrE PRELIMINARY REPORT No. 16 at 35. As of July 1, 1948, OIT was re-
ceiving applications at the rate of 15,000 a week and had a backlog of 37,263 applications. By
the beginning of 1949, however, license applications declined from 20,000 per week to 10,000
per week. Hearings before Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 548, 81st Cong.,
1st Sess. 10 (1949).
65. Francis McIntyre, Assistant Director of OIT, estimated in March, 1949 that
about two-thirds of export licensing had a security significance as against a division six
months previously of about 50-50 between security factors and shortages of supply. N. Y.
Times, March 5, 1949, p. 21, col. 1.
66. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, EXPORT LICENSING, AN ANALYSIS OF T11 PR0I1-
LEM OF LIcEsNiG HEAvILY OVERSUBSCRmED QUOTAS (Special Report No. 72, pt. 3) 6
(1948) (cited hereinafter as BNA REPORT).
67. Export Control Act § 4(b).
68. Ibid.
69. 3 EXPORT CONTROL REPORT 13.
70. BNA REPORT 6.
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port quotas. Similar wastage occurs when a license is granted for a shipment
subsequently denied a foreign import permit, or when an exporter is unable
to fulfill a sales agreement because of domestic procurement difficulties.7t
Though proration has never been employed as a method of license dis-
tribution, OIT has adopted two measures aimed at eliminating quota
waste. Exporters are required to submit with each license application clear
evidence of an accepted order covering the transaction between the applicant
and the foreign buyer.72 In addition, license applicants must submit proof
that the material covered by the application is in fact available to the ap-
plicant.
73
Historical Participation. Established exporters urge license distribution
according to pre-war participation in export trade. During the early years
of export control, OIT was easily persuaded to adopt this criterion.74 It
seemed only fair that exporters who had worked to establish American trade
in a period of competition and no controls should not have their shares of the
market subjected to a hostile licensing procedure. These traders had in-
vested effort and resources in the cultivation of foreign markets. Frequently,
they were best able to supply its needs. Producer-exporters, whose plants
had converted to war production, were deemed entitled to periods of re-
conversion during which their market shares were preserved until they could
effectively compete again for foreign sales.
75
Experience acquired in administering controls, however, demonstrated
the disadvantages of historical participation as a licensing standard. Afore
71. Ibid.
72. Third General Revision of Export Regulations, 15 CoDs Fp. Rros. Ca. III
§ 3732 (b), 13 FED. REG. 4078 (1948). See CURRENT ExrorT ButLs.Urxn No. 47Z July 23,
1948; CmuNr EXPORT BULIx No. 481, Sept. 9, 1948. Mere sworn certification is
adequate proof of an accepted order. See OIT Press Release No. 254, Oct. 13, 1943.
73. Third General Revision of Export Regulations, 15 Cor-P. Fmn. r Es. Cu. III
§373.3(b), 13 FEn. RFG. 4079 (1948). See CuRnENT Exronr BruuLnwn No. 465, July 8,
1945.
74. 1 ExPORT CONTROL REPORT 45-7. The base period most frequently used was that
between 1939 and 1941. Exporters who shipped a commodity during this period were
classified as historical exporters while others, regardless of earlier participation, were
classified as non-historical exporters. Normally, the share reserved for historical ex-
porters was 85%, with the remainder available to newcomers. Of these newcomers, war
veterans were allotted quantities generally 50% greater than those approved for non-
veteran newcomers. Variations in this arbitrary ratio were permitted when American
participation in a foreign market increased because of failure of other sources of supply.
See Hearings before Subcommittee No. 2 of [H. R.] Select Committee on Small Busi-
ness, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. 28-9 (1943) ; and REPoar oN Exro,-,n CONTROS Perns cAT
To H. R. 18, p. 2 (1948).
75. Sac'x- Comx., 2D QuARTR y RFn., ExronRT CoNTRoL AND AuOcATion Powms 9
(1948) (hereinafter cited as 2 ExPoRT CONTROL REP0oRT). See Hearings before Conmnittec
on Banking and Currency on H. R. 5470, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1943); Hearings be-
fore Subcommittee No. 2 of [H. R.] Select Committee on Small Business, 8Oth Cong.,
2d Sess. 28 (1948) ; Bell, New ExPort Licensing Policies of the Department of Cor-
inerce, Foreign Commerce Weekly, March 6, 1948, pp. 5, 6.
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and more, pre-war years became too remote to provide an accurate gauge of
those who should be permitted to export. Administrative protection of
historical shares established and perpetuated monopolistic market division
and price determination. Denied the possibility of seeking lower competitive
prices, foreign countries were forced to drain their dollar resources more
rapidly.7 And claims of merchant exporters to larger license allotments
only emphasized the difficulties inherent in determining how pre-war trade
was actually divided among competing trade groups." Consequently, OIT
has reduced the historical test to a status'merely coordinate with other
criteria. 78
Price. Price is potentially the most useful criterion for assigning license
priority.Y It not only insures competitive determination of the terms of
trade, but by making American goods available at a lower cost conserves
foreign dollar balances. But whatever its merits, OIT does not rely pri-
76. "The historical pattern of shipment has outlived its usefulness as the basic guide
to licensing distribution. In the interests of fostering the best competitive conditions in
international commerce, it is desirable to permit newcomers, small businessmen, and mer-
chant exporters to share in controlled export trade to the full extent of their competitive
ability." 2 EXPORT CONTROL REPORT 9. See McIntyre, New Export-Control Pollics
Safeguarding U.S. Interests, Foreign Commerce Weekly, Feb. 28, 1948, pp. 3, 34; BNA
REPORT 9; CURRENT EXPORT BULLETIN No. 431, Dec. 31, 1947.
77. "[Producer-exporters] generally contend that, since they control most of the mate-
rial at its source, they should receive all or substantially all of the export licenses issued.
On the other hand, the merchant exporters assert that, in the interests of small business,
of which they are an integral part, the bulk of licenses should be issued to them. Studies
of the statistics submitted by exporters showing their value of exports during the period
1937-46, indicated a typical breakdown between the producers and the merchant exporter,
to be 60 per cent to the mills and 40 per cent to the merchant exporter." 4 Exronr CoN-
TROL REPORT 36. OIT insists that quotas have actually been distributed in the ratio of
53.3 to 46.7. See, e.g., OIT Press Release No. 207, July 21, 1948; OIT Press Release No.
211, July 23, 1948; OIT Press Release No. 314, Jan. 18, 1949. Merchant exporters, how-
ever, remain unconvinced and maintain that in fact they receive 12% less than the norm
of 40% recognized by OIT as the appropriate share of merchant exporters. See N. Y.
Times, Jan. 3, 1949, p. 57, col. 3.
78. See CuRETr EXPORT BuuznN No. 457, May 18, 1948: "While the historical
method will not be the predominating factor in licensing commodities .. .it may be
taken into consideration, along with other criteria when quotas are oversubscribed in or-
der to insure, insofar as possible, a fair and equitable distribution of available quotas."
79. Prior to Jan. 1, 1948, OIT did not possess specific legislative authority to employ
price as a criterion for selecting exporters. Section 3 (b) of the Anti-Inflation Act of
1947, 61 STAT. 946 (1947), authorized OIT to use price criteria in the licensing of ex-
ports, "either by giving preference among otherwise comparable applications to those
which provide for the lowest prices, or, in exceptional circumstances, by fixing reasonable
mark-ups in export prices over domestic prices." On Feb. 19, 1948, Rep. Ploeser intro-
duced a bill, H. R. 5470, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948), to repeal this grant of authority be-
cause of the storm of criticism aroused by OIT's proposal, in CURRENT EXPORT BULLETIN
No. 431, Dec. 31, 1947, to employ the price criterion exclusively. The Committee on
Banking and Currency reported the bill out favorably, H. R. REP. No. 1543, 80th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1948), but the House failed to take any action. Export Control Act § 4 includes
price as one of the criteria OIT may employ.
,1314 [Vol. 58: 1325
EXPORT CONTROLS
marily on this criterion, except to screen out applications when they provide
for an "obviously excessive" price."
Failure to adopt price as the exclusive criterion stems both from adminis-
trative difficulty and trade criticism. Price can perform the function of
fixing license priority only if the necessary comparisons are made between
prices that are in fact comparable. And prices are comparable only when
determined under "comparable conditions of supply," a concept not easily
susceptible to administrative definition.5 ' Producer-exporters, paying no
commission to middlemen, possess a price advantage over merchant ex-
porters; merchant exporters, therefore, charge that use of the price criterion
denies them their traditional share of the export market . 2 In addition, a
free-along-side price, as contrasted with a free-on-board price,63 confers an
advantage on shippers located closer to ports of exit.81 And where the price
criterion has been used, exporters assert that, because of quota restrictions,
countries receiving aid from the United States pay higher prices elsewhere
for similar goods. 5
To the extent that ECA supervises prices paid by importers in participat-
80. CUrEXNT ExroaR Bui.zrix No. 457, May 18, 1948, provides that "proaisis s, of
§ 3(b) of Pub. L. 395 regarding price will be applied as one of the licensing criteria only
when the export price for the specific commodity is obviously excessive." Though vhat
constitutes an obviously excessive price is nowhere defined, see, for an illustration of
how this test may be used, Hearings before Comm;iittee o;, Ban~hing an:d Crrcncy on
H. R. 5470, 30th Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1943).
81. "The simple appeal of the formula 'lowest price for comparable merchandise un-
der similar conditions of supply' vll not make it easy to administer. Ealuations will fre-
quently have to be made of the cost and value of different methods of selling and of dif-
ferent services. A price must sometimes be put on sheer versatility, on the availability of
an assortment of techniques and terms for the service of differently situated foreign cus-
tomers .... Distinctions in method will not always lend themselves to close measure-
met... "lbran Co rm. = PrELmI1ARY REoaT No. 16 at 14. See 4 EXro Co:-
TRoL REPoRT 35.
8. H. R. REP. No. 1543, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (194S). See note 77 sutra. Trade
associations of merchant exporters have urged Congress to require OIT to mahe avail-
able to merchant exporters at least 50% of all allocations. See N. Y. Time:, Nov. 23,
1948, § 3, p. Fl; Hearings before Committee on Ban!hing and Crrc;:cy oa. S. 54S, 31st
Cong., 1st Sess. 175 (1949).
83. A free-on-board price is the price quoted at inland shipping points. Buyers are
responsible for all movement of goods from inland points of loading, and for any loss
or damage incurred after loading. The buyer is required to pay all transportation costs,
fees or charges, if any, levied because of exportation, and the cost and charges incurred
in obtaining the necessary documents. Under free-along-side price, the seller quotes a
price that includes delivery of the goods along side the overseas vessel, absorbing the
inland freight himself. For a definition of these and other terms used in foreign trade
adopted jointly by the United States Chamber of Commerce, the National Council of
American Importers, and the National Foreign Trade Council, see Gu=n.- TrusT
CosxuNy OF NEW Yoax, A Rvmyw or ExroRT Ax I.,so.r Procuuura 45-55 (194G).
84. Hearings before Committee on Banking and Cvrrency on H. R. 5170, 0oth Cong.,
2d Sess. 3, 11 (1948).
85. See Hearings before Sutbcommittec of the Committee on Banking and Curr nxy
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ing countries, OIT price control might be unnecessary. But ECA places no
price limitations on goods purchased with ECA funds, above which payment
authorizations will not be honored, lest a price ceiling become a price floor.
It does, however, seek to prevent dollar wastage and to reduce prices by in-
sisting on customary discounts and sales at prevailing market prices. 0
Where American exporters have charged excessive prices, ECA may try to
obtain a refund by moral suasion, but if such suasion fails, ECA can only
threaten to bar the offender from making future exports under its aegls87
Competitive Trade. OIT seeks to encourage the use of private trade chan-
nels whenever possible. Though reluctant to forbid foreign purchasing mis-
sions from transacting any business whatsoever, s OIT has required these
missions to demonstrate the competitive nature of their procurement pro-
cedures. 9 Even where the United States is the exporter, licenses are
on S. 548, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 48-9 (1949). And see N. Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1949, p. 46,
dol. 1; N. Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1949, p. 34, col. 2.
86. The Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, 62 STAT. 137, 22 U.S.C.A. § 1501 et seq.
(Supp. 1948) contained no provision for the policing of commodities procured under
ECA payment authorization. The Foreign Aid Appropriation Act of 1949, Pub. L. 793,
80th Cong., 2d Sess. §202 (June 28, 1948), remedied this deficiency by insisting that
no commodities be purchased in bulk with ECA funds at prices higher than those pre-
vailing in the United States at the time of purchase, adjusted for differences in the cost
of transportation to destination, quality and terms of payment. Determination of adjusted
market price was left to the ECA Administrator, guided by accepted trade practices.
This provision of the Foreign Aid Appropriation Act of 1949 was incorporated into the
Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 under both Senate and House proposed amendments.
See H. R. REP. No. 323, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 28-9 (1949); SEN. REP. No. 100, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1949); ECA, FIRST REPORT TO CONGRESS 17 (1948); Crawford,
United States Foreign Assistance Legislation, 1947-1948, 58 YALE L. J. 871, 889-92 (1949).
87. See statement of Samuel Nakasian, ECA price chief, reported in N. Y. Times,
Feb. 7, 1949, p. 28, col. 3. And see ECA, FIRsT REPORT TO Co NGRESS 17-18 (1948) ; N.Y.
Times, March 23, 1949, p. 41, col. 1. For a comprehensive discussion of ECA price
policies, see Crawford, United States Foreign Assistance Legislatio-, 1947-1948, 58 YALE
L. J. 871, 889-92 (1949). ECA requires a supplier's certificate that prices are not ex-
cessive and also makes periodic test-checks of procurement authorizations. See ECA,
SECOND REPORT To CONGRESS 71 (1949).
88. See statement of Wallace S. Thomas, OIT Director of Export Operations, N. Y.
Times, Jan. 22, 1949, p. 21, col. 1: "The United States Government has endeavored to
discourage the activities of foreign government purchasing missions in the United States.
The Government cannot go to the length of forbidding these missions to do any business
whatever. It must be kept in mind that the United States Government during the war
did purchasing for its own account through the United States Commercial Corporation
and other agencies. The fact that the United States Government no longer finds it neces-
sary to purchase extensively in this way does not necessarily imply that foreign govern-
ments no longer have need to purchase for their own account." For a list of foreign
government purchasing missions operating in the United States in June, 1948, see Hear-
ings before Investigation Subconwzittee of the Committee on Expenditures in the Exveei.
tive Departments Pursuant to S. Res. 189, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 768-73 (1948).
89. Third General Revision of Export Regulations, 15 CODE FED. RERas. C1. III
§ 373.2(f) (2), 13 FED. REG. 4078 (1948) : "Procurement by foreign governments will be
subject to continuous review in line with the announced policy of the United States to
[Vol. 58: 13251346
EXPORT CONTROLS
granted only on a showing that the use of ordinary commercial channels is
impracticable. "  Similarly, OIT has abandoned its former practice of
giving consideration to foreign embassy recommendations before selecting
licensees."
Enforcement
Equally as important as selecting an appropriate criterion for allocating
licenses is enforcing compliance with license awards. Without adequate
policing, export controls cannot successfully dampen inflationary pressures
or assure a desired geographic distribution of goods.
Securing effective enforcement is at once simple and difficult. The neces-
sity for all shipments to pass through ports of exit which provide a conven-
ient checkpoint where all controlled items must ultimately be scrutiiized
for violations of licensing regulations makes enforcement relatively easy.
But the task of enforcement is not complete until the exported goods arrive
at their destinations and are put to their intended use. Once beyond the
frontier, however, exported goods are outside American jurisdiction. In
this area, compliance activities face unique obstacles. 0IT's enforcement
problem is therefore a twofold one: (1) checking that only licensed com-
modities actually leave the United States; and (2) assuring that license pro-
visions calling for performance outside the United States are in reality ob-
served.
92
The first post-war years of export control produced wide-spread violations
involving license misuse and exporter malpractice. Licenses were secured
through the submission of false information, advertised for sale and freely
transferred. Export documents were altered or forged, while secret pay-
ments defeated efforts to control price. Goods were transshipped from a
maximize the restoration of private trade, and in every instance the foreign government
-will be requested... to establish the competitive nature of its procurement." Competi-
tive procurement by foreign purchasing missions requires a public request for sealed
bids from American suppliers, giving complete specifications for the commQdity to be
purchased, furnishing OIT vith a copy of the specifications, a list of suppliers sub-
mitting bids, the bids submitted by each and a statement of the amounts purchased frum
each firm. Successful bidders are then licensed, though the exportation of some purchases
in the name of the purchasing mission may be authorized. See CutnaMFN Ex~roir
BuumNi No. 431, Dec. 31, 1947; 2 ExPort C0 oNOL Rro.i 10; Hcarings bcfore
Snbcommittee Aro. 2 of the House Committee on Snall Bni-iness, SOth Cong., 2d Sess.
111 (1948).
90. Third General Revision of Export Regulations, 15 CoDz FE. Rrms. Cu. III
§3732(f) (1), 13 Fmz. REnG. 4078 (1948).
91. Id. §3732(e). In CURENT ExPoRT BULLETIN No. 431, DeM. 31, 1947, OIT
undertook to review recommendations of foreign embassies for approval of particular
license applications, though insisting such recommendations were customary and merely
advisory. See 3 ExPoRT CONTROL REmorr 13.
92. Hearings before Investigations Subcommittee of the Connifttee on Expe:difres
in the Executive Departmwents Pvrsant to S. Res. 1SQ. SOth Cong., 2d Sess. 612 (1943);
SE-;. REP. No. 1775, pt. 2, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1948).
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controlled to an uncontrolled destination, or diverted from a licensed to an
unlicensed use. 3
Not all the blame for these violations was properly attributable to OIT.
Some irregularities were a. product of Congressional failure to provide OIT
with adequate powers of investigation, while staff and appropriations were
microscopic compared with the number of transactions to be policed.
4
Post-war disappearance of "back-stop" controls such as ratiohing, priori-
ties and allocation powers, and foreign fund controls made enforcement more
difficult. 5 Exporters who expected rapid elimination of all export curbs
tended to ignore enforcement regulations.
OIT's internal policies, however, made possible many violations of its own
regulations. There was a natural tendency to make things administratively
easier for both licensing officers and applicants."6 Many officials were trained
to encourage rather than restrict trade. Consequently, licensing procedures
were developed that made violation easy and prosecution difficult. 7 Ade-
quate sanctions were available-criminal penalties of fine and imprison-
ment," civil seizure and forfeiture of goods illicitly exported," and admin-
93. SEN. REP. No. 1775, pt. 2, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-15 (1948); Hearings before
Subcommittee No. 2 of the House Select Committee on Small Business, 80th Cong., 2d
Sess. 22-5 (1948). See Wherry, Who's Getting the Scarce Goodsi, American Magazine,
August, 1948, p. 19; Time, April 5, 1948, p. 84; United States News, Dec. 24, 1948, pp.
48-9; Sondern, Uncle Sam's C-Men, Reader's Digest, January, 1949, p. 111.
94. 3 ExPoRt CONTROL REPORT 16. See Secretary of Commerce Sawyer's bitter com-
plaint that OIT "was hamstrung by a lack of funds" and "existed on a beggar's rations
and occupied a death cell." Hearings before Investigations Subcommittee of the Com-
mittee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments Pursuant to S. Res. 189, 80th
Cong., 2d Sess. 756 (1948). OIT's staff now totals 670. Hearings before Subcommittee
of the Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 548, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1949).
But only 47 persons were on duty in the enforcement division in October, 1948. See
October Monthly Administrative Report, OIT Enforcement Branch, October, 1948
(copy in Yale Law Library).
95. 3 EXPORT CONTROL REPoar 16. See note 11 vtpra and Ostroff, Export Control
Program: Vigorous Measures Instituted, Foreign Commerce Weekly, July 31, 1948, p. 4.
96. See Hearings before Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Expendi-
tures in the Executive Departments Pursuant to S. Res. 189, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 763
(1948).
97. Ibid. See SEN. REP. No. 1775, pt. 2, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1948).
98. The First Export Control Act, 54 STAT. 714 (1940), carried its own penalties,
Violators could be punished by a fine of $10,000 or by imprisonment for not more than
two years, or both. During 1946 and 1947 a total of seven cases were referred to the
Department of Justice for action. See Hearings before Committce on Bankinq1 and
Currency on H. R. 5470, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1948). And of 12 cases referred to
the Justice Department during the past fiscal year, only two have resulted in actual
prosecution, both involving bribery of O' officials. The rest are still under investiga-
tion. Communication to the YALE LAw JOURNAL from Nathan Ostroff, OIT General
Counsel, Nov. 24, 1948 (copy in Yale Law Library). See OIT Press Release No. 230,
Aug. 20, 1948. Export Control Act § 5 reduces the criminal penalty for violation to
$10,000 or one year in jail or both.
99. 40 STAT. 223 (1917), 22 U.S.C. §401 (1946). A wide variety of goods has
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istrative suspension or termination of the privilege of securing or using a
license.' But OIT's enforcement regulations did not adequately define the
legal basis for proceeding against suspected law breakers.' 0
The new powers conferred by the Export Control Act, coupled with re-
vised licensing procedures, permit a vigorous enforcement crusade. For the
first time, OIT has been given powers analagous to those possessed by other
federal regulatory agencies-to make investigations, require the keeping of
records, subpoena witnesses and compel testimony under oath.'e2 Reflecting
been seized under this power. See, e.g., United States v. 21 Pounds, 8 Ounces of
Platinum, 147 F.2d 78 (4th Cir. 1945); United States v. 2C0 Watches, (5 F.Supp. M-
(S.D.N.Y. 1946); United States v. 251 Ladies Dresses, 53 F.Supp. 772 (S.D.Tems
1943); The Cachalot III, 60 F.Supp. 527 (S.D.Fla. 1945). See OIT Press Release No.
346, Apr. 7, 1949 (seizure of 1,300,000 lb. of carbon black valued at $150,000 and actually
intended for Europe instead of Mexico as stated in the shipping declaration); OIT
Press Release No. 214, Aug. 4, 1948 (seizure of $10,500 of vitreous china water closets
requiring a license to all destinations, declared cast iron xwater closets not subject to
export controls). Twelve seizures of illegal exports wcre made in the last half of 194S.
6 Exronr CoN-ROL REPORT 16.
100. Administrative actions instituted by the OIT in the last half of 1943 included:
Personnel suspensions 3
License privileges cancelled for a specific period 8
License privileges suspended indefinitely 8
Veterans preference cancelled 0
Referred to other government agency 6
Referred for personnel action 2
Charging letter submitted 21
Warning letter submitted 95
Placed under surveillance 74
Revocation of license 26
Application rejected 12
Shipment ordered returned to the United States 2
Total 257
See 6 ExrorT CONTROL REPORT 16; OIT Press Releases No. 354, April 2,). 1949; No.
328, March 4, 1949; No. 320, Feb. 18, 1949; No. 316, Feb. 3, 1949; No. 253, Oct. 18,
1948; No. 220, Aug. 12, 1948.
101. 3 ExPoar CON-MOL REPoar 16; 4 Id. at 35-6. For a similar complaint voiced by
OPA enforcement officials against OPA price regulations see Praox .mzs n Prncn Co,;-
TROL: NATIOAL OsncE ORGxNIZATION AND MAITAGEIMNT 122 (Gen. Pub. No. 12, OPA
Historical Reports on "War Administration, 1947).
102. Export Control Act §6(a). Section 6(b) incorporates the standard provision
for immunity from subsequent prosecution because of compulsory testimony. Section
6(c) specifically prohibits OIT from disclosing any information received from license
applicants unless withholding it would be contrary to national interest. Advance notice
of any intention to restrict dealings in any commodity would result in a rush by spcu-
lators to secure licenses before the effective date of the proposid control. See Hcarings
before Committee ons Banking and Curre7cy on H. R. 5470, 0th Cong., 2d Sess. 79
(1948). Consequently Export Control Act § 7 grants OIT immunity from all provisions
of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 STAT. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001 (194'i),
except the requirement for publication of regulations in the Federal Register (Adminis-
trative Procedure Act § 3) and notice and hearing on all proceedings instituted by OIT
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earlier licensing experience, current regulations describe conduct likely to
incur criminal, civil or administrative sanctions. Licensing procedures are
designed to retain greater control over the license by OIT before and after
issuance.103
Domestic Compliance. A major feature of OIT's enforcement program is
a restatement of the responsibilities of all parties to a license transaction. 1 4
Exporters are warned against misrepresenting the country of ultimate des-
tination, the proposed end use or the true consignee in license applications.
Submitting an order or purchase commitment with intent not to abide by
its terms will subject the exporter to both criminal and adminstrative sanc-
tions. 1 5 Barred also is the receipt, use or alteration of any export control
document for the purpose of making a shipment other than that author-
ized.100 The once prevalent practice of advertising or soliciting licenses for
sale or purchase, transferring licenses to other parties without OIT approval,
or changing named parties is now prohibited.1 1 A code of ethics has been
promulgated to govern the activities of expediters appearing before OIT in
behalf of license applicants. These expediters are forbidden to influence
OIT, Post Office or customs officials to take any license action. They are
precluded from soliciting the handling of business before OIT or charging a
fee contingent upon the grant of a license.103 The status of freight forwarders,
persons professionally engaged in facilitating overseas shipment, has been
clarified to establish their authority to act and their responsibility in han-
dling and clearing shipments in order to eliminate any illicit advantage that
to enforce subpoenas issued under Section 6. Comparable exemptions have been authorized
in Sugar Control Extension Act, 61 STAT. 35 (1947), 50 U.S.C.A. App. 981 (Supp.
1948); Housing and Rent Act of 1947, 61 STAT. 193 (1947), 50 U.S.C.A. App. 1881
(Supp. 1948). See SEN. REP. No. 31, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1949).
103. Ostroff, Export Control Compliance Program: Vigorous Mcasures Instituted,
Foreign Commerce Weekly, July 31, 1948, p. 3.
104. Id. at 4. See 4 ExroRT CONTROL REPORT 37-8; 3 id. at 16-17.
OIT licenses exports, not exporters. But "[flor the purpose of eliminating dis-
reputable and dishonest exporters," a Senate investigating committee has recommended
that OIT give "consideration . . . to establishing an approved list of exporters....
Individuals and firms desiring to be considered for the approved list should be required
to file a registration statement setting forth detailed information concerning themselves
or the firms they represent." SEN. REP. No. 1775, pt. 2, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1948).
105. Third General Revision of Export Regulations, Amendment No. 1, 15 Coon
FED. REGS. CH. III § 371.2a, 13 FED. REG. 4098-9 (1948). See CURRENT ExVoiR BUL-
LETIN No. 467, July 9, 1948; CompRwEENsivE ExPoRT SCHEDULE No. 26, Oct. 1, 1948,
p. 71.
106. Ibid.
107. Third General Revision of Export Regulations, Amendment No. 1, 15 CoDE FED.
REGs. CH. III § 371.4a, 13 FED. REG. 4099 (1948). See CURRENT ExPoRT BULLETIN No.
467, July 9, 1948; COMPREHENSIV ExPoRT SCHEDULE No. 26, Oct. 1, 1948, pp. 71, 73,
108. Third General Revision of Export Regulations, Amendment No. 2, 15 CoM,
FED. Rws. CH. 111§ 370.1, 13 FED. REG. 4098 (1948); CURRENT ExPoRT BULLETIN NO.
467, July 9, 1948, p. 3; COMPREHENSIsE EXPORT SCHEDULE No. 26, Oct. 1, 1948, p. 73.
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might accrue to any exporter who employed them."c3
Other regulations are designed to prevent tampering with the license
itself. Special security paper, typewriters and perforating machines have
reduced the possibility of forgery, and "clean copy" is required of all ex-
port control documents. 10 The Shippers Export Declaration, once a mere
statistical document, has been transformed into an export control document.
OIT regulations require such declarations to be authenticated by the col-
lector of customs at the port of exit prior to exportation. Customs officials
may authenticate the document only when it is presented by an authorized
agent of the licensee and after comparison with the OIT validated license.'
OIT receives from the Census Bureau a monthly report listing every ship-
ment leaving the United States on an export license for comparison with
OIT's own record of validated licenses.
12
Foreign Compliance. While primarily responsible for effective foreign
compliance, OIT necessarily delegates part of the task to other Federal
agencies. Both Customs Service and the Post Office Department share in
actually policing exportation as it takes place to prevent unauthorized ship-
ments to unauthorized destinations.' 3 Political and security objectives of
export controls emphasize the importance of close cooperation with intel-
ligence services of the government such as the Central Intelligence Agency
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.1 4 Foreign Service personnel, ECA
officials and friendly foreign governments may be enlisted to trace trans-
actions in countries of licensed destination.
115
Destination and end use controls may likewise be made effective by con-
trolling the ordinary instruments of foreign commerce. Banks, insurance
companies and carriers, in their normal operations, frequently become aware
of attempted violations. But since these interests cooperate voluntarily,
OIT has never exploited its power to extend any enforcement regulations to
the "financing, transporting and other servicing of exports ... ." 1I
109. See CURRENT FXPORT BuLL'rm No. 488, Oct. 15, 1948; CUrRENT Exro,-r" BL--
iLr No. 497, Dec. 1, 1948.
110. OIT Press Release No. 246, Sept. 22, 1948. See CURRiENT Exronr BuLr.M:.
No. 484, Sept. 24, 1948; CURRENT ExPoRT BLLrriN No. 503, Feb. 4, 1949; Thomas,
Plugging Illegal Export Leaks, American Import & Export Bulletin, Sept. 1948, p. 1.
New validating stamps and perforating machinery were introduced almost simultaneously.
See OIT Press Release No. 236, Sept. 2, 1948; CURRENT Exronr BuLL'uxu No. 41,
Sept. 9, 1948.
111. See CURRENT ExPoRT Butan rn No. 471, July 22, 1948; CURRENT Esro.r Bt:L-
LENIN No. 490, Oct. 21, 1948; CURRENT ExroRT BU.LZTL'r No. 498, Dem. 8, 1948; Ct-
RENT ExPoRT BtuLm. r No. 510, Feb. 11, 1949; OIT Press Release No. 203, July 2,
1948; OIT Press Release No. 263, Oct. 21, 1948; CoitrmuE:sn Exro.r Scnuorm
No. 26, Oct. 1, 1948, p. 74.
112. See HEa= Comyrrzz PREL~rIINARY REP=OR No. 16 at 19.
113. SEN. REP. No. 1775, pt. 2, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1948).
114. Hearings before Inz'estigations Subcommittee of the Committee or Expe,:ditures
in. the Executive Departments Pursuant to S. Res. 1S9, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 765 (1943).
115. Id. at 617.
116. Export Control Act §3(a). Regulations to impose a legal liability on the in-
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EXPORT CONTROL AND COMMERCIAL POLICY
At first glance, the very idea of export controls appears to conflict with
the avowed goals of American commercial policy."' Controls are obviously
barriers to the free flow of goods. Moreover, no system of quantitative
restrictions exists or could be devised by which quotas could be allocated
without discriminating among countries seeking to buy from the United
States. An equal quota for each country would be absurd. And allocation
in proportion to imports in a base year would fail to reflect changes both in
supply and in requirements."'
The anomaly of such controls is underlined by the fact that since the
passage of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934,119 the United States
strumentalities of foreign commerce have been proposed, see Hearings before Investiga-
tlions Subcommittee of the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments
Pursitant to S. Res. 189, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 762 (1948), and approved by the Senate
Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Department, see SEN. Rrx. No. 1775, pt.
2, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1948). OIT, however, has failed to enact them on the
ground that "the proposed regulations as drafted posed a number of serious legal and
practical problems which must be resolved if they are to do an effective policing job
without being burdened by what are claimed to be unjustifiable legal liabilities and
business costs." Letter from Nathan Ostroff, General Counsel, OIT, to William P.
Rogers, Chief Counsel, Investigations Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Ex.
penditures in the Executive Departments, Sept. 29, 1948 (copy in Yale Law Library).
117. A double standard of international trade morality is not unknown in commercial
history. American commercial policy prior to the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act,
48 STAT. 943 (1934), as amended, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1351 (Supp. 1948), is illustrative, and
see COM MERCIAL POLICY IN THE POST WAR WORLD (League of Nations Publications II
A: Econ. & Financial No. 7) 62 (1945) : "In the past, governments have too often ap-
proved recommendations in favor of liberal policies in principle, and in practice raised
higher and higher barriers to trade .... They have only too frequently exemplified the
Latin saying: 'Meliora probo; deteriora sequor' (I approve the better, but follow the
worst). .. ."
118. The proportional method, i.e., allocation among importing countries in propor-
tion to imports shipped in a "representative period" is "the only [scheme] which call
ensure as equitable an allocation as the existence of quotas Allows. . . ." COMMERCIAL
POLICY IN THE PosT-WAR WORLD (League of Nations Publications II A: Econ. &
Financial No. 7) 46-7 (1945). For a criticism of this formula and suggestions for
minimizing the discriminatory character of quotas, see TRADE RELATIONS BETW EN
FREE-MARKET AND CONTRQLUD EcoNoMIEs (League of Nations Publications II A:
Econ. and Financial No. 4) 62-70 (1943). See also, QUANI'TATViE TRADE CONTROLS
(League of Nations Publications II: Econ. & Financial No. 5) 24 (1943); YouNGa,
THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 524-6 (1942); COxDLIFFE, THIE IREcoNSTRUCrixO or
WORLD TRADE 218-20- (1940).
119. 48 STAT. 943 (1934), as amended, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1351 (Supp. 1948). The Recip-
rocal Trade Agreements Act made possible an active tariff bargaining policy by authoriz-
ing a reduction in American import duties contingent upon the grant of similar conces-
sions by other countries. Through incorporation of the unconditional most-favored-nation
principle, concessions made to one country were automatically extended to all. Only
countries discriminating against American trade or pursuing policies contrary to the
purposes of the Act were denied similar privileges. See TAscA, TnE RECIPROCAL TRADE
POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES (1938).
Originally, the President was empowered to reduce tariffs by as much as 50%
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has led a campaign to reduce trade barriers and eliminate all forms of trade
discrimination. 12- During the war, pledges to remove trade barriers were
incorporated in the Lend-Lease Agreements, -1 2 1 Atlantic Charter, -2 and
Bretton Woods Agreement. -1 2 3 And in 1947,23 nations, 2 4 urged by the United
of duties in force in 1934. By 1945, rates had been reduced by the full 50% on 425 of
dutiable imports and something less than the permissible 50% on 20% of the remaining
imports. 59 STAiT. 410 (1945), as amended, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1351(a) (2) t Supp. 1943) au-
thorized a further reduction of 50c low rates in force en Jan. 1, 1945, tr a ttal tfi 75',
below 1934 duties, in order to maintain American bargaining power. Tir U:;rrsn STAvES
REcIPRocAL TRDE-AGREE-MENTS PROGRAIU AND THE Prorosm TRAnD OoGA:NIZATION
(Dep't State Pub. No. 3112, Comm. Policy Ser. No. 112) 2 (194S3; Smith, l'celop-
sneit of Polic, Under the Trade Agreements Program, 50 Q. J. Eco:N. 217 (193fi);
Berglund, Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, 25 A2m Eco-.. REv. 411 (1935).
120. Some sort of action was necessary in the unstable thirties, because of the shrinl:-
ing volume of international trade. Following World War I, relatively free world marhets
had disintegrated into tightly isolated segments. State interference v. ith ordinary economic
processes in the name of military preparedness, economic stability or speedy industrializa-
tion always turned out to be restrictive of international trade. See Knorr, The Fwdttons
of an Intcrnational Trade Organiiation: Possibilities and Limitations, 37 An. Eco-.
Rzv. 542 (1947) (Papers and Proceedings of the 59th Annual Mcetinv- of the Ameri-
can Economic Association). For a statistical demonstration of the dterirati, C#; in-
ternational commerce and the need for multilateral world trade, see Tun 'XTwora: o.
Won-D TRADE (League of Nations Publications II A: Econ. & Financial No. 3) (1942).
Reasons influencing states to adopt restrictions on trade are e.amined in Q rANTITA
TRADE Co_,vaoLs (League of Nations Publications II: Econ. & Financial No. 5) 23-33
(1943) ; HEszl, op. cit. snpra note 4, at 3-47.
121. "In the final determination of the benefits to be provided to the United States ...
in return for aid furnished .... the terms and conditions thereof shall be such as not
to burden commerce between the two countries, but to promote mutually advantageous
economic relations between them and the betterment of worldwide economic relati.ns.
To that end, they shall include provision for agreed action, ... open to participation by
all other countries of like mind, directed to. . . the elimination of all forms of dis-
criminatory treatment in international commerce, and to the reduction of tariffs and
other trade barriers... ' MAsra Lu.,D-Lrisn AGPEEMEunn' WITH Gm-T BniTu:: Art.
VIL See REPORT To CoxGuRss ox LEzND-Lr~sn OPExroNs r02 THE YZAR E::.L
MARcH 11, 1942, p. 50. Similar articles were included in agreements with other countries,
e.g., China, see 5TH REPORT To CoxoNREss Ful THE PRIOD ENDIN;G JU:,N 11, 1942, pp.
31-2; and Russia, see STE QuARTERLY RrxoPT To Coorr.ss oN LE-D-LE.5sE O -z4Txo:-s
FoR THE PErIOD E.NDED 'MARcH 11, 1943, p. 52.
122. ATLAN-TIc CHARTER Art. IV provides that the United States and Great Britain
agree to "endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the en-
joyment by all states, great and small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms,
to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic
prosperity. .. "
123. Governments participating in the Bretton Woods Conference adopted a reolu-
tion to "reach agreement as soon as possible, on ways and means w.,hereby they may
best: (1) reduce obstacles to international trade and in other ways promote mutually
advantageous international commercial relations. . . ." U.nzr NATi0Zs %Mmr nv AND
FINANcIAL CoNFRENcr, FINAL AcT AND RELA.,TED DoCumuEUTS (Dep't State Pub. No.
2187, Conf. Ser. No. 55) 24 (1944). See Pehle, The Bretton Jroods Ins!l jitions, 55
YAI.E L. J. 1127, 1129 (1946).
124. Australia, the Benelux countries (Belgium, Luxemburg and The Netherlands),
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States, met in Geneva to discuss tariff reductions. The ensuing Geneva
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade primarily emphasized schedules
enumerating articles for which specified concessions were granted after bi-
lateral negotiations; 121 its general provisions, however, were designed to
prevent impairment of concessions either by prohibiting restrictive and
discriminatory measures altogether or by defining the limits within which
they might be employed. 126 Similarly, the Havana Charter for an Interna-
tional Trade Organization,127 adopted by the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Employment in 1948, was fathered by the United States. 12
Its key provisions call for equal treatment of all nations and the abolition of
special privileges in commercial treaties 129 and decree that "no prohibitions
or restrictions, other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made
effective through quotas, licenses or other measures, shall be instituted by
any member." 130 While, as in the Geneva Agreement, certain exceptions
Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, India, tile
Customs Union of Lebanon and Syria, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Southern
Rhodesia, the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States.
GENERAL AGREEM ENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (Dep't State Pub. No. 3107, Comm. Policy
Ser. No. 111) (1948).
125. See ANALYSIS OF GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADO (Dep't State
Pub. No. 2983, Comm. Policy Ser. No. 109) (1947); GENERAL AGRE.RAIENT ON TAnIFFS
AND TRADE (Dep't State Pub. No. 3107, Comm. Policy Ser. No. 111) (1948).
126. Exceptions, however, far outnumber the absolute prohibitions, E.g., GENEVA
AGREEMENT Art. XI prohibits the use of quantitative restrictions, but is hedged in by
permanent exceptions, and must be read in the light of Arts. XII, XIV, and XVIII-
XXI, which permit deviations from the prescribed norm for reasons ranging from the
protection of public morals to safeguarding the national security. But see ANALYsis
OF GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (Dep't State Pub. No. 2983, Comm.
Policy Ser. No. 109) 198 (1947): "In substance, . . . [the Geneva Agreement] may
be described as constituting a general prohibition against the use of quotas, this prohibi-
tion then being made subject to carefully defined and closely controlled exceptions per-
mitting their use in justifiable or necessary circumstances. .. ."
127. HAVANA CHARTER FOR AN INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORGANIZATION (Dep't State
Pub. No. 3206, Comm. Policy Ser. No. 114) (1948). See WILLOUGHBy, AmtEiucAx TRADE
POLICY (Dep't State Pub. No. 3091, Comm. Policy Ser. No. 110) (1948).
128. The Havana Charter had its genesis in the American PROPOSALS FOR EXPANSION
OF WORLD TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT (Dep't State Pub. No. 2411, Comm. Policy Ser.
No. 79) (1945) first published in December, 1945, and later elaborated in the form of a
SUGGESTED CHARTER FOR AN INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORGANIZATION OF THE UIrTED1
NATIONS (Dep't State Pub. No. 2598, Comm. Policy Ser. No. 93) (1946). These pro-
posals persuaded UNESCO to call the International Conference on Trade and Employ-
ment that ultimately approved the Havana charter in 1948. The planned ITO, now
awaiting ratification, still strongly resembles the original State Department proposals,
although many concessions were necessarily made to win support of other countries,
For the text of the President's message submitting the Havana Charter to the Senate,
urging swift ratification, and the State Department's memorandum in support of the
Charter, see 20 DEP'T STATE BULL. 601-6. (1949.)
129. HAVANA CHARTER Art. 16. An execption is made for tariff rates on certain
products based on historic agreements.
130. Id. Art. 20.
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cut into this flat prohibition," the Charter condemns quantitative restric-
tions in principle and limits them to exceptional cases."'2
Whether the exceptions contained in either agreement justify the use of
American export controls is debatable. In general, these exceptions do not
envisage the imposition of export restrictions by a dominant creditor and
trading nation like the United States. Many were incorporated to enable
non-industrialized, underdeveloped and debtor nations to safeguard their
b-ilance of payments and protect their internal economic interests.3 3 And
while Article 45(b) (1) of the Havana Charter authorizes retention of quanti-
tative restrictions when essential to the acquisition or distribution of prod-
ucts in general or local short supply, it adds the proviso that these measures
be consonant with the principle that all countries are entitled to an equitable
share of the international supply of such products. Consequently, OIT's
restrictive licensing policies have already been attacked as violating the
principles laid down in the Geneva and Havana agreements.Y Czecho-
131. Exceptions permitted in the Havana Charter are reminiscent of those contained
in the Geneva Agreement. Like Gs-rA AGREE-1ENT Art. XI, see note 12 stfpra,
HAvA A CHAnRE Art. 20, see text accompanying note 130 supra, calls for the general
elimination of quantitative restrictions, then proceeds to list exceptions w:here discrimina-
tion may be imposed without violating the Charter. Other parallelisms are apparent.
Compare general exceptions to the rule prohibiting discriminatory trade policies listed
in HAA NA CATER Art. 45 zith GEaxxvAi AGR-.ZIErr Art. XX; coinpare HVANA
CHARTER Art. 21 aith GENEvA AGREE.MET Art. XII, etc. It is worthy of nute that only
the 23 signatories to the Geneva Agreement are bound by its provisions, v.while 57 natiens
are considering adoption of the Havana Charter.
132. For a defense of the Havana Charter, even with many e-ceptions incorporated,
see WiLcox, A CHARER FoR WoRLD TraDE (1949); Acnso:, Eco-.o,.txc PoLlev A::D
THE ITO (Dep't State Pub. No. 3511, Econ. Coop. Ser. No. 19) 4 (1949); Mikexell,
Qzaantitative and Exchange Restrictions Under the ITO Charter, 37 Am. Eco:.. RLv. 351
(1947); Wilcox, The London Draft of a Charter for an International Trade Organica-
lion, 37 Ami. Eco-. REv. 529 (1947) (Papers and Proceedings of the 59th Meeting of the
American Economic Association); Knorr, The Functions of an Internatio:al Trade Or-
ganication: Possibilities and Limitations, 37 Id. 542 (1947).
The National Association of Manufacturers, however, opposes the Havana Charter
on six major grounds, the first of which is that: "It gives legal sanction to principles
and methods of international trade which stand in complete opposition to the principles
of freer non-discriminatory, multilateral trade. Indeed, it legalizes the economic jungle
in which the world has lived since the early Nineteen Thirties." N. Y. Times, Mar. 31,
1949, p. 39, col. 1. The National Foreign Trade Council has also announced opposition to
American adherence to the ITO charter, presumably for similar reasons. N. Y. Times,
Jan. 26, 1949, p. 35, col. 2.
133. See, e.g., HAVA.TA CHARTER Art. 21, permitting trade restrictions to safeguard a
country's balance of payments, and note 131 supra.
134. Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, as well as Russia, joined in malking these
charges against American export control policy before the Committee on Development
of Trade of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, meeting in Geneva,
on Feb. 15, 1949. Paul R. Porter, American delegate, responded to these attacks on a
note of altruism by insisting that "So long as the Soviet Union pursues a policy wiich
hundreds of millions of people throughout the world regard as aggressive, the United
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slovakia has accused the United States of repeatedly violating the Geneva
agreement and the Havana Charter by adhering to a discriminatory trade
policy in refusing to issue licenses for the export of many products to Czecho-
slovakia.13 The Committee on Development of Trade of the United Nations
Economic Commission for Europe has rejected a Czech resolution calling
for an investigation of United States trade practices.'
In defense, OIT insists that American use of export controls has been
carefully confined to the limited exceptions contemplated by the ITO
Charter. 3 ' Security export controls, for example, channelling goods away
from Eastern Europe, despite the bans against discrimination posted in
both the Havana and Geneva Agreements, find support in the general ex-
ception enumerated in ITO Charter Article 99 permitting quota controls
over traffic in goods or materials directly or indirectly supplying the military
establishment of another country. In any event, OIT has never interpreted
security licensing to require complete embargo of shipments to Soviet bloc
countries, recognizing that a broad definition of goods possessing military
value might be as unwise as one too narrow.135 Even a quantitatively small
volume of scarce goods exported from the United States might enable their
States will not aggravate the risks to peace loving countries by shipping goods of signifi-
cant military value to the Soviet Union ... ." N. Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1949, p. 11, col,
2. For the anonymous views of a "very high economic official of one of the principal
satellite countries" that American discrimination on exports is "irritating but unsuccess-
ful," see N. Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1949, p. 7, col. 1.
135. Czechoslovakia alone of all the Russian satellite countries is a signatory to the
Geneva Agreement and thus able to press charges under it. Czech participation in the
agreement came before Czechoslovakia fell under Russian domination,
136. The Czech resolution was defeated by a vote of 11-6. N. Y. Times, Feb. 20,
1949, p. 1, col. 4. The next day, Czechoslovakia announced its intent to charge the
United States formally with violation of the Geneva agreement, first by filing a note
with the United States requesting bilateral negotiations with a view to settling the
issue, and then by filing a complaint with the contracting states administering the Geneva
Agreement, if these discussions prove fruitless. N. Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1949, p. 5, col. 5.
In part, the Czech claim is based on denial of export license for a rolling mill costing
$23 million on which $16 million had been paid, and refusal of export permission for
ball bearings, penicillin and streptomycin. Formal charges that the United States export
licensing system constitutes a violation of the Geneva Agreement were filed Mard 25,
1949, see N. Y. Times, March 26, 1949, p. 1, col. 5, and placed on the agenda of the con-
tracting nations responsible for administering the multilateral tariff accord, see N. Y. Times,
April 9, 1949, p. 5, col. 4.
137. Communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from Nathan Ostroff, General Counsel,
OIT, July 21, 1949. Mr. Ostroff adds that the declaration of policy contained in Export
Control Act § 2 was "consciously related and limited to ITO precepts." And after studying
the areas in which the proposed ITO Charter would be incompatible with existing United
States law and/or practice, the United States Tariff Commission has concluded "that
various exceptions in the Charter (particularly Articles 45 and 99) would permit con-
tinuance of the program on a temporary basis." U. S. TARIFF CommissIoN, REroRT ON
THE HAVANA CHARTER FOR AN INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORGANIZATION 34 (1949).
138. 4 ExPoRT CONTROL REPORT 15. Strict controls over shipments to Eastern Europe
reduced exports to that area from an annual rate of $400,000,000 in the second quarter
of 1947 to an annual rate of $125,000,000 in the third quarter of 1948. H. R. Rm'. No. 18,
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purchasers to produce essential materials for the United States or for coun-
tries that would otherwise require assistance from the United StatesY2
And American industry depends on Eastern Europe for many raw materials,
some not available elsewhere. 1" A policy that provokes retaliation might
dry up this source of supply."'1 Moreover, ECA countries generally follow
America's lead in curtailing shipments of commodities denied licenses by
OIT for security reasons,14 2 so that American export control policy might
adversely affect the volume of trade bet,een Eastern and Western Europe.
Yet a greater volume of East-West trade would benefit both halves of a
81st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1949). In the first quarter of 1948 before controls to Eastern Europ2
were introduced, total exports to that area amounted to $78.8 million; in the second
quarter they fell to $25.1 million. The sharpest decrease was in exports to Rusia
which fell from $20.8 million in the first quarter of 1948 to $4.2 million in the
second and $1.7 million in the third. The largest decrease took place in e:ports of
machinery and vehicles which declined from $44.4 million in the 1st quarter of 1948 to
$6 million in the second quarter of 1948. 6 ExPoar CoroiL R~rorT 12.
American policy was recently modified to strike Yugoslavia from the list of eastern
bloc countries. N. Y. Herald Tribune, March 29, 1949, p. 1, cal. 2. As a result of a
more "sympathetic" export licensing policy tovard the Tito regime, Yugoslav trade
with the West is expected to double in 1949. N. Y. Times, April 10, 1949, § 3, p. Fl, col.
1. See N. Y. Times, April 8, 1949, p. 7, col. 1.
139. 4 EXPORT CONTROL REPO-RT 33: "An embargo on shipments from the United
States would be completely untenable. . . . Much of the steel and other scarce materials
exported from the United States is being used abroad to expand production of petroleum,
nonferrous metals, and other short supply materials for shipment bac: to this c-.un-
try...."
140. In 1947, e.g., the United States obtained from the U.S.S.R. 28,% of total chrome
imports, 58% of total platinum imports and 657 of total cadmium imports. In addition,
the United States obtained a substantial share of its furs from Russia and its woovd pulp
from Finland. 4 Exroar CONTROL REPORT 15.
141. Russian exports to the United States dropped 75% in January, 1949, to their
lowest point since restrictive licensing of Eastern European shipments vyas introduced
on March 1, 1948. The value of American imports of tro strategic materials, manganese
and chrome, dropped from $2,700,000 in December, 1948, to $1,20D,000 in January, 1949.
N. Y. Times, March 22, 1949, p. 43, col. 5. For a report that Russia vll reduce
manganese exports to the United States to one tenth and chromite to 40% of the amount
the United States expected to purchase as reprisal for American export licensing pAlicy,
see N. Y. Times, March 3, 1949, p. 4, col. 1. In March, 1949, Russian exports to the
United States of steel hardening chrome and manganese declined another 50%. N. Y.
Times, May 14, 1949, p. 20, coL 2-3.
142. Economic Cooperation Act § 117(d), 62 STAT. 137, 153, 22 U.S.C.A. § 1515(d)
(Supp. 1948) provides that: "The Administrator is directed to refuse delivery insofar as
practicable to participating countries of commodities which go into the production of any
commodity for delivery to nonparticipating European countries which commodity would
be refused export licenses to those countries by the United States in the interests of na-
tional security.. .. " See 4 ExPoRT CONrROL REPORT 15.
For an announcement by the British Government of a list of products of potential
military value to be added to those for which export licenses are required, see N. Y.
Times, April 1, 1949, p. 3, col. 6; N. Y. Times, March 26, 1949, p. 1, col. 5. Although
British e-x-ports are also controlled by a licensing system, the government has tried to
avoid using licenses to direct exports to specific destinations. Instead Britain tries to
direct the production of certain goods for export to particular destinations by controlling
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continent that is economically interdependent, 4 3 and would reduce the
drain on the United States for economic assistance.
In a sense, export controls are consistent with the long run objectives set
forth in the Geneva Agreement and the Havana Charter-the elimination
of trade barriers and the expansion of world trade. Present barriers to trade
are, after all, only symptomatic of a more basic disease. 144 Post-war eco-
nomic disturbances and political insecurity only reinforced an instinctive
desire to insulate national economies from external forces. Popular pressures
compelled national action to provide immediate employment, without re-
gard for international consequences. Faced with a desperate lack of all
types of consumer goods and many raw materials, most countries imposed
trade restrictions that permit exchange of available exports for only most
urgently needed and essential import requirements. 14 Both the European
recovery program and American export control policy seek to eliminate the
causes of the growth and maintenance of these trade restrictions. By chan-
nelling goods to countries most in need, and most important in world trade, 4'
the issuance or withdrawal of building, equipment or raw material licenses and by co-
operation with industries concerned. See 5 LABOR AND INDUSTRY Ix BRITAIN 220-21
(1947) ; 6 Id. 40-41 (1948) (a summary of British controls still in operation).
143. For statistical proof of the commercial and general economic interdependence of
the European continent before the war see EUROPE'S TRADE (League of Nations Publica-
tions II A: Econ. & Financial No. 1) (1941); THE NETwVo1c OF WORLD TRADE (League
of Nations Pub. II A: Econ. and Financial No. 3) (1942).
144. "Even those . . . countries most eager to see their countries' foreign trade move
back toward normal were handicapped by the disorganized conditions left in the wake
of the war-the destruction of productive facilities, the exhaustion of supplies, the
disruption of transport and distribution channels, the scrambled ownership in industry,
the inadequacy of foreign exchange assets, the internal financial confusion, and often
also the unsettled status of the government regime itself. . . . [A] large measure of
governmental control and even direct official intervention in foreign-trade arrangements
seemed unavoidable, at least for a time." Chalmers, Current Trends itt Foreign Trade
Policies, Foreign Commerce Weekly, Feb. 23, 1946, p. 9. See Thorp, The Necessity for
Foreign Investment, 13 DEP'T STATE BULL. 829 (1945). And see Carlston, Import and
Export Controls, 11 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 795 (1946): "The restoration of foreign
trade will be brought about by no such simple stroke as the elimination of trade barriers
alone. . . . [Viarious restrictive measures adopted by states . . . are not the primary
cause of the breakdown in . . . trade but are rather induced by other and more deep-
seated forces and are a part of many causative forces."
145. See notes 120 and 144 siupra. For a general discussion of the reasons why nations
introduced trade barriers in the period between the two World Wars, see COMMERCIAL
PoLuc" IN THE PosT-WAR WORLD (League of Nations Publications II A: Econ. &
Financial No. 7) 22-6 (1945); QUANTITATIVE TRADE CONTROLS (League of Nations
Publications II: Econ. & Financial No. 5) 28-38 (1943); COMMERCIAL POLICY IN' THE
INTERWAR PERIOD (League of Nations Publications II A: Econ. & Financial No. 6)
68-72 (1942); THORP, PROBLEMS OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN EcoNoMIC PoLICY (Dep't
$tate Pub. No. 2750, Comm. Policy Ser. No. 104) 5-15 (1947).
146. Intra-European trade alone accounted for a significant share of total international
trade before the war, while Europe's trade with the rest of the world constituted a major
portion of all other trade. See THE NETwoRI OF WORLD TRADE (League of Nations
Publications II A: Econ. & Financial No. 3) 39, 41 (1942); Etmo.s TRADE (League
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they make possible the restoration of productive facilities so that these na-
tions can remove barriers and resume normal trade. Moreover, restoring
world trade hinges on speedy world recovery, and both goals depend on
continued American prosperity. 1 7 Export controls help curb the dangers
that threaten continued domestic prosperity and permit most efficient
utilization of scarce foreign dollar balances.
CoNcLusIoN
American export controls have not escaped criticism, both from traders
denied export permission "I and countries cut off from access to American
goods. 49 These criticisms are in part unavoidable, for in formulating an
appropriate commercial policy the United States faces two problems that
are separate but by no means independent. ' While safeguarding its own
immediate interests, the United States seeks as rapidly as possible to restore
the world to a political and economic stability that will replace the uneasy
equilibrium of pre-war years. But in the long run, the United States seeks
to create international institutions and common agreements that will enable
this new stability to be maintained in an orderly world.'' Unless political
and economic stability is achieved, permanent institutions and agreements
cannot be expected to succeed. To the extent that export controls help
achieve this immediate objective of American commercial policy, their
retention and continuance are justified.
of Nations Publications II A: Econ. & Financial No. 1) 15-23 (1941); note 143 supra.
In addition, Europe was America's best customer. In the years 1939-41, 34.1W of all
American exports by value went to continental Europe, almost twice as much as Ameri-
can exports to Canada, which ranked next in importance. For the dependence of Europe
on American exports, see notes 14 and 15 supra. For a graphic demonstration of American
dependence on international trade, see WVoRLD TRADE AND THE UNITED Srxrs (Dep't State
Pub. No. 3492, Comm. Policy Ser. No. 119) (1949).
147. For a discussion of the extent to which the restoration of world trade depends
on the United States, see DE'r CommEcr, TnE U.xrrz STATE-s Ix: Trn Worwm Eco.onx"
(1943); HAxsEN, Aa--ucA's ROLE 1-1 THE WORLD EcoNoMY (1940). See also Hoovimo
INTERNzATIOxAL TRADE AND DOMESTC EmPLOYMENT k1945).
148. See, e.g., the lament of merchant exporters, notes 77 and 82 supra.
149. See notes 134-7 supra.
150. "Our problems are of two kinds. There are immediate problems, relating princi-
pally to the tasks of making good the material ravages of war. There are longer run
problems, involving the organization of the world economy to achieve the maximum out-
put of goods and services and the elevation of living standards. The two are by no means
independent of each other. . . ." Clayton, The Importance of Intenational Econon:ic Rc-
lationzs to World Peace, 14 DEP'r STATE Bum 677, 679 (1946). See Lockawod & Schmeis-
ser, Restrictive Business Practices in Inteniational Trade, 11 LAw & Coxmnp. Pron. 63,
664 (1946).
151. See generally, HAWnIs, A FoREIGN Ecoxo ic POLICY FOR THE U,'nrr STATEs
(1948) ; HoovER, INTERNATi AL. TRADE AND DoMEstIC EMIPLOYZIE14T (1945) ; CoxmI.Tr-,
THE FOREIGN EcoOMic POLICY OF THE U ITED STATES (Yale Institute of International
Studies, Mlemo. No. 11) (1944); CONDLiFFE, THE C0emoz I,.rREsr r.i I,'TEnATIONAL
Ecoxonc ORGANIZATIoN (International Labor Office Studies and Reports, Series B (Eco-
nomic Conditions) No. 39) (1944). And see Bagett, World Trade and World Peace, 34
A.B .AJ. 1087 (1948).
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